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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court's jurisdiction is based on Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(2)(b)(i), or, in 
the alternative, Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the City Council have jurisdiction to consider the neighboring landowners' 
appeal of the Draper City Planning Commission's decision? 
The Court's determination of the jurisdiction of the City is analogous to a court's 
determination under Rule 60(b), and is, therefore, reviewed to determine whether the trial 
court abused it's discretion. Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114, 1117 (Utah App. 1989). 
The City's defense to this issue was preserved for appeal at R. 371-372. 
2. Did the Owners obtain a vested right to build on the upper portion of their lot? 
The Court's determination of the existence of a vested right is a mixed question of 
I 
fact and law, and is therefore, reviewed for correctness, giving appropriate discretion to the 
critical facts as found by the trial court. Scherbel v. Salt Lake City, Corp., 758 P.2d 897 
(Utah 1988); State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). 
The City's defense to this issue was preserved for appeal at R. 366-370. 
3. Did the Court abuse it's discretion in denying the Owners' asserted claim of 
equitable estoppel? 
The Court's review of a trial court's decision on a claim of equitable estoppel is 
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. State Dep't of Human Serv. ex rel Parker v. 
Irrizarv. 893 P.2d 1107 (Utah App. 1995). 
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The City's defense to this issue was preserved for appeal at R. 366-370. 
4. Did the Court err in reviewing the Owners' claims for injunctive relief under 
the standard established in Utah Code Annotated §10-9-1001 (1992)? 
This Court's interpretation of a statute is a matter of law and is, therefore, reviewed 
for correctness. One Intern. (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447 (Utah 1993). 
The City's defense to this issue was preserved for appeal at R. 72-79. 
5. If the trial court did dismiss the Owners' claims for injunctive relief, was the 
dismissal proper? 
This Court's determination of a trial court's decision on a Motion to Dismiss is a 
matter of law, and is, therefore, reviewed for correctness. West v. Thomson Newspapers, 
872 P.2d 999 (Utah 1994). 
The City's defense to this issue was preserved for appeal at R. 72-79. 
6. Are the Owners' claims regarding the reasons for the City's decision barred by 
the doctrine of res judicata? 
The trial court's application of the doctrine of res judicata is a mixed question of fact 
and law, and is, therefore, reviewed for correctness, giving appropriate discretion to the 
critical facts as found by the trial court. Scherbel v. Salt Lake City, Corp., 758 P.2d 897 
(Utah 1988); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). 
This defense was preserved for appeal at R. 365. 
7. Was the court's decision that the City's actions were not arbitrary, capricious, 
or illegal correct? 
This Court's review of a District Court's decision on a challenge to a municipality's 
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land use decision under Utah Code Annotated §10-9-1001 (1992) is reviewed under an abuse 
of discretion standard to the extent the trial court's decision is based on evidence presented to 
the court, and is reviewed under a correctness standard to the extent the determination is 
based on the record from the administrative proceedings of the municipality. Davis County 
v. Clearfield Citv. 756 P.2d 704 (Utah App. 1988). 
The City's defense to this issue was preserved for appeal at R. 372-376. 
8. Was the City's decision based on "public clamor?" 
The trial court's determination of the basis for the City's decision is a finding of fact 
and will be sustained if there is substantial evidence in the record from which the trial court 
could have determined the facts as they did. In re Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 
1989). 
The City's defense to this issue was preserved for appeal at R. 372-376. 
9. Is the Owners' misrepresentation cured by a lack of bad faith? 
The Court's determination of the effect of the Owners' misrepresentation is analogous 
to a court's determination under Rule 60(b), and is, therefore, reviewed to determine whether 
the trial court abused it's discretion. Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114, 1117 (Utah App. 1989). 
The City's defense to this issue was preserved for appeal at R. 371-372. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The Addendum to this Brief contains the full text of all determinative statutory and 
constitutional provisions. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
This case originates from a request by the Appellants, Stephen Brendle and Richard 
Maires, (hereinafter "the Owners"), to the Draper City Planning Commission for an 
exception or modification to the Draper City Hillside Overlay Ordinance for the Owners' lot. 
This request was made in June, 1994. The Planning Commission denied the requested 
exception and the Owners appealed to the City Council, which also denied the exception in 
August, 1994. A Petition for Review was then filed in the Third District Court, Case No. 
940905958AA, the Honorable Anne Stirba. Judge Stirba determined that the decision of the 
City was not arbitrary or capricious and upheld the City's issuance of a stop work order. 
(See Addendum p.36-39). The Owners did not appeal that decision. 
In April, 1995, the Owners requested that the Planning Commission reconsider it's 
earlier denial of their request, based on a change in circumstances. The Planning 
Commission agreed and on April 20, 1995, approved the Owner's request to grant an 
exception to the terms of the Hillside Overlay Ordinance. An appeal of the Planning 
Commission's decision was filed with the City more than 14 days after the Commission's 
decision. On June 8, 1995 the Planning Commission reconsidered its April 20 decision, and 
again granted approval of the Owners' request. An appeal was filed with the City Council 
on June 9th, and on June 13, 1995, the City Council reversed the determination of the 
Planning Commission and issued a stop work order on the Owners' project. 
The Owners then filed suit in the Third District Court, the Honorable Leslie Lewis, 
requesting review of the City's decision and also alleging several violations of State and 
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federal law in a Complaint. The City filed a Motion to Dismiss, claiming that the issues 
were barred by the doctrine of res judicata, and that the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the 
case unless the action was brought under Utah Code Annotated §10-9-1001 (1992). The 
Court denied the City's Motion to Dismiss, but determined that the Owners' claims should be 
reviewed under §10-9-1001, and that if necessary, the Court would hear additional evidence. 
On review of the merits, the District Court upheld the City's determination. 
This appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. In April, 1994, Stephen Brendle and Richard Maires, Plaintiffs, (hereinafter, 
the Owners), executed an option agreement with a Developer to purchase Lot 304 (the Lot) 
in the Cove at Bear Canyon subdivision. The Option made purchase of the Lot contingent 
on the Owners obtaining approval to build on the upper portion of the Lot from Draper City. 
(R. 249-251). 
2. Significant portions of the Lot are sloped in excess of 30% grade. (R. 267-
268). 
3. Draper City Ordinance 9-15-040(a), (part of the City's Hillside Overlay 
Ordinance, set out in full in the Addendum to this brief), prohibits development on slopes in 
excess of 30%, but allows the City Planning Commission discretion to modify this 
requirement upon making specific findings relative to the project at issue. (See Addendum 
p.13-15; R. 267). 
4. In April, 1994, the Owners applied for a building permit to construct a 
residence on the upper portion of the Lot. A permit was mistakenly issued by the City 
before the Owners received approval from the Planning Commission. (R. 259-261). 
5 
5. In late April, 1994, the Owners started construction on the residence. (R. 
270). 
6. In June, 1994, Draper City issued a stop work order on the Owner's 
construction based upon the failure of the owners to obtain approval from the City Planning 
Commission. (R. 270). 
7. On June 23, 1994, the Owners appeared before the Planning Commission and 
contested the stop work order. (R. 271) 
8. The Planning Commission upheld the stop work order and denied the 
requested approval to build on the upper portion of the Lot as proposed by the Owners. (R. 
271). 
9. The Owners appealed the decision of the Planning Commission to the City 
Council, which upheld the decision of the Planning Commission. (R. 271-272). 
10. The Owners filed a Petition for Review in the District Court and the District 
Court, Case No. 940905958AA, after reviewing the petition on the merits, upheld the City's 
decision, finding specifically that the Planning Commission and City Councils' actions were 
not arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. (R. 272; Addendum at p.36-39). 
11. In mid-April, 1995, the Owners requested that the Planning Commission 
reconsider their petition to build on the upper portion of the Lot. In their request, the 
Owners alleged that conditions had changed since the earlier petition, representing that now 
there was no opposition from the neighboring landowners. (R. 274-278). 
12. On April 20, 1995, the Planning Commission approved the Owner's request to 
build on the upper portion of the Lot. (R. 282-283). 
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13. On May 1, 1995, the Owners began foundation work on the home on the 
upper portion of the Lot. (R. 287). 
14. In late May, 1995, more than fourteen days after the Planning Commission's 
approval, a neighboring landowner appealed the decision of the Planning Commission to the 
City Council. (R. 292, 337). 
15. On or near June 1, 1995, the Owners were informed by Paul Glauser, the 
Draper City Community Development Director, that an appeal of the Planning Commission's 
decision had been filed by a neighboring property owner. (R. 291-292). 
16. On June 8, 1995, the Planning Commission re-heard the Owners' petition and 
granted permission to build on the upper portion of the Lot. That decision was appealed by 
neighboring landowners to the City Council on June 9, 1995. (R. 293-294). 
17. With knowledge of a potential appeal to the City Council, the Owners 
expended further funds and continued construction on the site. (R. 295-296, 301-302). 
18. The City Council held a hearing on the neighbor's appeal on June 13, 1995. 
At that hearing, evidence was presented by neighbors in opposition to the Owner's petition, 
contrary to the Owner's previous representations that there was no longer any objection from 
neighboring landowners. (R. 296-297; Addendum p.30-35). 
19. The City Council overturned the decision of the Planning Commission, and 
denied the petition of the Owners, approving the stop work order. (R. 298; Addendum p. 30-
35). 
20. The Owners appealed the decision of the City Council to the District Court. 
21. The District Court upheld the decision of the City Council, finding that the 
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City had jurisdiction to hear the appeal, when the basis for the appeal was to correct 
misinformation supplied by the Owners to the Planning Commission, and finding also that 
the City's actions were not arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. (R. 222-225). 
22. This appeal followed. (R. 226-227). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court's determination that the City had jurisdiction to consider the appeal of 
the Planning Commission's decision was not an abuse of discretion. The rule establishing 
the time for appeal is subject to equitable considerations, and the court's determination that 
the Owners should not profit from their own misrepresentation was correct and prevents an 
unjust and untenable result which would establish a poor precedent. 
The trial court's determination that the Owners did not obtain a vested right was 
legally correct. The law has long held that a party may not obtain vested rights based upon 
the party's own misrepresentation. Accordingly, the Court's determination was correct. 
The trial court's determination that the City was not estopped from issuing the stop 
work order was not an abuse of discretion. A party who appears before the court seeking 
equity must come with "clean hands." The court's factual determination that the Owners 
misrepresented facts, whether the misrepresentation was in bad faith or not, provides a sound 
basis for the trial court's decision. 
The trial court's determination to review the Owners' claims under Utah Code 
Annotated §10-9-1001 was correct and the court's review considered the Owners' claims for 
injunctive relief under that standard. The record clearly establishes that the court did not 
dismiss the Owners' claims, but considered whether or not the City's actions were illegal, as 
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well as whether or not they were arbitrary or capricious. 
If the trial court did dismiss the Owners' injunctive relief claims, the dismissal was 
proper. The court's determination that the Owners did not have a vested right to build on 
the upper portion of the Lot compels the conclusion that the claims for injunctive relief, 
which are founded on the allegation of a vested right, fail to state a claim. The takings 
claims are based on regulation of the use of the property, not on an actual physical invasion. 
Therefore, to establish a taking which violates constitutional principles, the Owners must 
demonstrate a complete destruction of their property. They have not, and cannot make such 
an allegation. Also, the Owners have no real investment-backed expectation concerning the 
property, because they made their purchase contingent on the ability to gain approval to build 
on the upper portion of the Lot. 
Any of the Owners' allegations which concern the City's basis for decision are barred 
by the doctrine of res judicata. The Owners challenged the City's basis for denying their 
requested exception in a prior action in the Third District Court, the Honorable Anne Stirba. 
Judge Stirba upheld the decision of the City and that decision was never appealed. In the 
case at bar, the City Council's reason for denying the requested exception was the same as 
the reason which the District Court found in the prior action to be sufficient and not 
arbitrary, capricious or illegal. Therefore, because the same claim was already raised and 
litigated, relitigation of the issues is barred by res judicata principles. 
Assuming, arguendo, the City's basis for decision can be challenged in this action, 
the decision was not arbitrary, capricious or illegal. The City determined that it would not 
grant the requested modification out of a desire to remain consistent with the stated purpose 
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of the Hillside Overlay Ordinance. Such a decision is clearly not arbitrary or capricious. 
Additionally, even if the City did consider the objections of the neighboring landowners, 
those objections were proper because they indicated that significant harm, in the form of 
instability of property values, could result from allowing the requested exception. Therefore, 
the City's decision was not arbitrary, capricious or illegal. These same reasons clearly 
demonstrate that the City's decision was not based on "public clamor," as alleged by the 
Owners, but on sound policy considerations, which are entitled to deference in this Court. 
Finally, the Court's determination that the Owners' apparent lack of bad faith did not 
preclude the City from hearing the appeal is not an abuse of discretion. The decision is 
clearly supported by strong equitable considerations, and is in accord with good public 
policy. A party should not be allowed to benefit from their misrepresentation to the 
detriment of the public, and the Council's determination of what is detrimental to the public 
should be accorded deference. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE CITY HAD JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER THE NEIGHBOR'S APPEAL OF 
THE PLANNING COMMISSION'S DECISION 
While Draper City Ordinance 9-6-050, (Addendum p. 11-12), provides that appeals 
from determinations of the Planning Commission should be filed with the City Council 
within 14 days of the Commission's decision, such a time limitation is not jurisdictional, but 
is subject to considerations of equity. Dumais v. Somersworth, 134 A.2d 700 (N.H. 1957); 
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Borough of Malvern v. K.R.I. Corp., 570 A.2d 633 (P.A. 1990) (two-year statute of 
limitations on seeking refund from municipality held subject to equitable considerations). 
In Dumais, a building inspector for the City of Somersworth had issued a building 
permit to Dumais to construct a garage on his premises. When construction was 
substantially completed, nearly a month after the permit was issued, an appeal was filed by a 
neighbor. A Board rule required that any appeal be filed within ten days. In proceedings 
before the Board of Adjustment, it was determined that the garage was in violation of the 
City's zoning ordinance, and Dumais' permit was revoked. 
Dumais argued that the Board was precluded from revoking his permit because the 
appeal was not filed within the requisite ten day period. The Supreme Court of New 
Hampshire rejected Dumais' appeal. The Court noted that an objecting party could not be 
bound by a lack of notice and confirmed the Board's earlier finding that the appeal had been 
received within a reasonable time, as soon as the appealing party had notice of the granting 
of the permit. 
The facts of the case presently before this Court are strikingly similar to those in 
Dumais, and the sound reasoning of the New Hampshire Supreme Court should be applied. 
To deny the City jurisdiction to proceed in this case, would allow the Owners to obtain their 
desired result, in contravention of clearly stated City policy, by misrepresentation. The 
Owners were allowed to go before the Commission a second time only because they 
represented their was no longer opposition to their project. (R. 274-278). The appeal must 
1 1 
be allowed to correct the misrepresentations of the Owners1. 
Were the Court to hold otherwise, an untenable precedent would be established. The 
ordinance clearly contemplates that any party seeking an exception to its terms bear the 
burden of establishing the necessary facts before the Commission, and the Council if neces-
sary. To place the burden of verifying statements of fact presented to the City by a party 
seeking a modification of the ordinance is contrary to the ordinance's clear intent. It also 
would place an unworkable burden on the City. The Ordinance was adopted in a time of 
unprecedented growth and the strains that the growth-associated development have placed on 
City resources are tremendous. (R. 107-108). The Hillside Overlay Ordinance is one means 
of controlling some of that growth in a manner consistent with concerns for public safety, the 
environment and aesthetics. To require the City to establish the facts for an applicant's 
exception is too great a burden to bear. Additionally, denying the City the ability to correct 
the misrepresentation will lead to the inequitable situation wherein a right to proceed in 
violation of stated City policy is gained by alleging facts which are, at worst, untrue, and at 
best, unsubstantiated. Such a result is clearly not good policy and should be avoided. 
II. 
THE OWNERS DID NOT OBTAIN ANY VESTED RIGHT 
It is widely held that a permit issued upon misrepresentation is not valid and the party 
with such a permit has no vested right. P.P. Corp. v. Lewis, 373 So.2d 929 (Fla. App. 
1979); Westchester County Soc'v for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Mengel, 36 
1
 The policy behind the Dumais decision has also been adopted by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
and their Federal counterpart in Rule 60(b) which allows a Court to do equity by relieving a party of the unjust 
effects of a judgment based on misrepresentation or mistake. It is clear that the law does not favor a circumstance 
which would allow a party to profit from their own misrepresentation. 
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NYS2d 531 (1972); McQuillan Mun. Corp. §26.217 (3rd Ed. 1986); 13 Am. Jur. 2d 
Buildings §11 (1964). Based on the clear findings of the District Court, the Owners' 
misrepresentation bars any claim that they possessed a vested right to proceed. 
In P.P. Corp. the court considered whether or not the City could revoke a building 
permit that had already been issued, and construction on the building had started. The court 
held that the revocation of a building permit is justified when the submitted plans contain a 
material misrepresentation. The court further found that it made no difference whether the 
submitting party knew of the misrepresentation or not. 
The Owners' citation to Western Land Equities v. Logan, 617 P.2d 388 (Utah 1980) 
is not contrary authority to the above-stated proposition. In Western Land, the Court held 
"that an applicant for subdivision approval of a building permit is entitled to favorable action 
if the application conforms to the zoning ordinance in effect at the time of the application... 
" IcL at 391. The Court had no reason to, and did not address the circumstance where a 
permit is granted based upon misrepresentation. It is difficult to imagine that the Court 
would have allowed the applicants in Western Land to proceed had their application 
misrepresented facts which, if properly stated, would have been in conflict with the then-
applicable zoning regulations. Such is the case presently before this Court and, accordingly, 
Western Land is not authority for the proposition that a party who misrepresents facts, 
whether in bad faith or not, can profit to the extent of gaining "vested rights.2" 
2
 The Owners stress in their brief the tremendous expense incurred in the building of their home 
in an apparent effort to convince this Court that the "equities" are in their favor. It should be noted that initially, 
work was started before the Owners ever applied for approval from the City Planning Commission. (R. 270). 
Then, on two separate occasions, the Owners incurred further expense by continuing work pending an appeal they 
had knowledge of. (R. 289, 291-293, 301-302). Finally, it should be noted that when the Owners purchased the 
Lot, they purchased with full understanding that the City had not approved building on the upper portion of the Lot. 
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From the foregoing it is clear that, based upon the Owners' misrepresentations to the 
City, they could not and did not obtain any vested right to build their home in violation of 
the Hillside Ordinance. 
III. 
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING THE OWNERS' 
CLAIM OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL 
A trial court's ruling on the question of equitable estoppel is reviewed under an 
"abuse of discretion" standard. State Dep't of Human Serv. ex rel Parker v. Irrizarv, 893 
P.2d 1107 (Utah App. 1995). In this case, it is clear that the trial court did not abuse it's 
discretion in refusing to apply equitable estoppel against the City. 
It is a well settled doctrine of equity that a party who seeks equity from the court 
must appear before the court with clean hands. Nielsen v. MFT Leasing, 656 P.2d 454 
(Utah 1982); Jacobson v. Jacobson, 557 P.2d 156 (Utah 1976). In the trial court's ruling on 
the merits of the petition for review, the court found: 
Petitioner's (sic) were not entitled to rely upon the decision of 
the Planning Commission in lifting the stop work order when 
the decision was based upon erroneous information which was at 
least in part supplied to the City from Petitioners' (sic) and 
which was erroneous information not checked for accuracy by 
Petitioners' (sic). 
(R. 225, 16). 
The Court's determination that the City was not equitably estopped was clearly based 
on it's factual finding that the Owners supplied the City with incorrect information, which 
the Owners made no effort to substantiate, and that information was the basis for the 
(R. 249-251). From the foregoing, its seems apparent that the Owners have not acted innocently, and that the 
supposed "equities" do not actually favor their position. 
14 
Planning Commission's change in decision. The court implicitly determined, from the facts 
presented at the hearing on the Owners' Petition for Review, that it would be inequitable to 
allow the Owners to supply bad information, and then gain advantage over the City on the 
basis of that information. The Court's determination is clearly supported by the evidence, 
(See R. 223, 224), and was not an abuse of discretion. 
IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT DISMISS THE OWNERS' CLAIMS FOR 
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, BUT DECIDED THEM ON THE MERITS 
In their Brief, the Owners argue that the trial court's ruling on the City's Motion to 
Dismiss "precluded [the Owners] from pursuing state and federal constitutional claims set 
forth in their verified Complaint or from obtaining declaratory relief or injunctive relief 
under Utah Code Ann. §78-33-1 et seq " (Brief of Appellants at p.25). The record 
does not support the Owners' assertion that they were precluded from pursuing those claims. 
The City's Motion to Dismiss asserted that the Owners' action should have been filed 
as a Petition for Review under Utah Code Annotated §10-9-1001 (1992), and that the claims 
presented in Counts II, IV, V and VI of the Complaint should be dismissed. (R. 74-77). 
Section 10-9-1001(3) requires that on a Petition for Review of a City's land use decision: 
[T]he Court shall: 
(a) presume that land use decisions and regulations are valid; and 
(b) determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, capricious, 
or illegal. 
(emphasis added). 
The Court denied the City's motion, but determined that the claim should be treated 
as a petition for review, and that "taking of additional evidence may, therefore, be 
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required... ." (R. at 212). By denying the City's Motion to Dismiss counts II, IV, V and 
VI of the Complaint, and determining that the Complaint should be treated as a Petition for 
Review under §10-9-1001, the trial court did not dismiss the Owners' claims, but determined 
that they should be reviewed to determine whether or not the City's actions were illegal. 
The Owners cite to no evidence to support their assertion that they were precluded 
from pursuing their claims, and the record does not support their assertion. To the contrary, 
the court specifically allowed for the presentation of additional evidence if required. (R. 
211-216). 
The pleadings filed by the Owners also indicate that the Court did not preclude them 
from pursuing their asserted claims. In the Owners' response to the City's Motion to 
Dismiss, they asserted that Section 10-9-1001 did not preclude consideration of the issues 
raised by their claims, arguing that a determination of whether the City's actions were illegal 
necessarily included a determination of all the issues raised in the Complaint. (R. 84-85). 
The record further demonstrates that the Court decided the issues raised in Counts II 
through VI of the Complaint on the merits. The Owners specifically asserted that "Counts II 
through VI of the Complaint allege that Plaintiffs acquired a vested property right in the 
development of their property by virtue of their reasonable reliance on the final decision 
rendered by the Planning Commission... ." (R. 85). The Court found that the Owners had 
acquired no vested rights. (R. 225, f3). In consideration of the Owners' assertion that 
Counts II through VI were based on the allegation of a vested right, the court's conclusion 
that the Owners obtained no vested rights requires a finding that the Owners' claims fail on 
the merits. 
IS 
The record is clear that the claims presented in Counts II through VI of the Complaint 
were not dismissed, but the trial court determined whether or not the claimed illegality 
existed, and made a determination on the merits that the City's actions were not illegal. That 
decision should not be overturned. 
V. 
IF THE TRIAL COURT DID DISMISS THE OWNERS' CLAIMS FOR INJUNCTIVE 
RELIEF, THE DISMISSAL IS SUPPORTED BY SOUND REASONS, AND IS, 
THEREFORE, NOT ERROR 
While the record does not support the Owners' assertion that claims II, IV, V and VI 
of their Complaint were dismissed, assuming, arguendo, it is true, the trial court's decision 
to dismiss the Owners' claims for injunctive relief was correct. All the claims for injunctive 
relief rest on the allegation that the Owners obtained a vested right to build on the upper 
portion of the Lot. The Court's determination that they obtained no vested right was proper, 
as demonstrated in Section II, infra. Because the court found that the facts alleged to support 
the claim were not present, its determination that the claims fail is correct. Additionally, the 
Court's review of the case was limited by the statutory standard of review, and the takings 
claims were premature. Some of the claims are barred by the Owners' failure to comply 
with the Governmental Immunity Act, and finally, the takings claims are manifestly without 
merit. 
A. SECTION 10-9-1001 LIMITS THE COURT'S REVIEW TO WHETHER THE 
CITY'S ACTIONS WERE ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, OR ILLEGAL 
As noted above, Section IV, infra, Utah Code Annotated §10-9-1001 (1992) dictates 
17 
the standard of review for administrative appeals from a municipality's land use decision. 
The plain language of this statute requires a court to determine if the actions of the 
municipality were illegal. It specifically provides a remedy for relief from a municipality's 
judgment. Because the Owners have an adequate remedy at law in Section 10-9-1001, any 
claim for extraordinary relief such as injunctive relief is improper. Counts II through VI of 
the Complaint seek injunctive relief, and, therefore, if the trial court's decision did dismiss 
the Owners' claims, the decision was not error. 
B. THE OWNERS' TAKINGS CLAIMS WERE PREMATURE 
In Williamson County Planning Com'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), the 
Supreme Court held that until an administrative decision regarding the development of 
property was final, and alleged damages were made certain by determining what development 
would be allowed, the court has no final decision to review. In the case at bar, until the 
District Court completed it's Administrative Review, and the Owners have obtained a 
decision as to what development would be allowed on the Lot, no final question for review 
was presented. Under the law of Williamson County, the Owners' takings claims are 
premature until a final decision is made regarding what development will be allowed on the 
property. * 
C. THE OWNERS' CLAIMS FOR RELIEF UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
AND UTAH LAW ARE BARRED BY THEIR FAILURE TO FILE A NOTICE OF 
CLAIM AS REQUIRED BY THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the Owners' claims based on the State Constitution and 
state law are not barred by their failure to complete the administrative process prior to filing, 
(see infra, above), the claims are barred by the Owners' failure to file a Notice of Claim. 
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The Utah Governmental Immunity Act requires: 
Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental 
entity, ... shall file a written notice of claim with the entity 
before maintaining an action, regardless of whether or not the 
function giving rise to the claim is characterized as 
governmental. 
Utah Code Annotated §63-30-11(2) (1991). 
This requirement is strictly construed by Utah Courts. State v. Bellonio, 911 P.2d 
1294 (Utah App. 1996). In Bellonio, the Plaintiffs was injured at the Salt Lake City 
Airport. His attorney had served a notice of claim on the State Attorney General, the City 
Attorney, the Airport Director and counsel for the Airport's insurance carrier. The Court 
held that, although the City and the Airport clearly had notice of the intent to bring suit well 
within the required time period, and despite the fact that actual notice was received, the 
Plaintiff's failure to strictly comply with the terms of the Governmental Immunity Act was 
fatal to his claim. 
In the case at bar, there is no allegation that a notice of claim was ever filed. 
Therefore, the Owners' failure to comply with the terms of the Governmental Immunity Act 
is fatal to their state law-based claims. 
D. THE OWNERS' TAKINGS CLAIMS WERE WITHOUT MERIT AND DISMISSAL 
WAS, THEREFORE, PROPER. 
Utah law holds that when the character of the interference alleged results from 
regulation of the uses of property, to amount to a taking the regulation must rise to the level 
of complete destruction, confiscation, or deprivation. Colman v. State Land Board, 795 
P.2d 622 (Utah 1990); Bountiful v. DeLuca. 292 P.2d 194 (Utah 1930). The Owners 
contend, citing Colman, that the City's application of the Hillside Ordinance amounts to a 
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taking because it has materially lessened the value of their property. This claim 
misapprehends the law. 
In Colman, the State Supreme Court held that a factual question existed as to whether 
or not the Plaintiffs property had been taken or damaged, in violation of the State 
Constitution. The Plaintiff in that case had alleged complete destruction of his property, in 
that he claimed the State's actions prevented him from using the canal for the express 
purpose for which it was constructed. Based upon the allegation of complete destruction, the 
Court remanded the case to determine whether, in fact, a taking had occurred. In 
distinguishing the argument presented by the State, the Court stated: 
[T]he emphasis the State places on the police powers is often 
made when there is a close issue that turns on the difference 
between a taking or damage under article I, section 22 and mere 
regulation of property and activities on property. Many statutes 
and ordinances regulate what a property owner can do with and 
on the owner's property. Those regulations may have a 
significant impact on the utility or value of property, yet they 
generally do not require compensation under article I section 22. 
Only when governmental action rises to the level of a taking or 
damage under article I, section 22 is the State required to pay 
compensation. 
Colman at 627. 
This view was earlier expressed by our State Supreme Court: 
that the exercise of proper police regulations may to some extent 
prevent enjoyment of individual rights in property or cause 
inconvenience or loss to the owner, does not necessarily render 
the police law unconstitutional, for the reason that such laws are 
not considered as appropriating private property for a public 
use, but simply as regulating its use and enjoyment, and if the 
owner through a lawful exercise of the power suffers 
inconvenience, injury, or a loss, it is regarded as damnum 
absque injuria, provided always, that constitutional mandates 
have not been invaded by a confiscation, destruction, or 
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deprivation of property... . 
DeLuca, 292 P.2d 194 (Utah 1930). 
From the foregoing citations, it is clear that when the character of the interference is 
regulation of the uses of property, to amount to a taking, it must rise to the level of complete 
destruction, confiscation, or deprivation. In the case at bar, the Owners have made no 
allegation of complete destruction, and, in fact, cannot do so. The Lot in question is still 
buildable in the lower portion, as originally approved3. That the value of the Lot may be 
greater with a home in the upper portion is undisputed, but that fact does not turn the 
application of the ordinance into a "taking" of property. The Owners here have made no 
such allegations, nor could they. Accordingly, the allegation of a taking fails to state a claim 
and the decision of the trial court was proper. 
It is equally clear that the Owners' allegations of a taking under the Federal 
Constitution are insufficient to state a claim. In Perm Central Transportation Co. v. New 
York, 438 U.S. 104, 98 S. Ct. 2646 (1978), the Supreme Court clearly held that a claim that 
a regulation prohibits an economically beneficial use and diminishes the value of property is 
not sufficient to state a claim for a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment, but that the 
regulation must operate to deny practically all beneficial use of the property at issue. 
Additionally, in assessing claims of regulatory takings, the Supreme Court has 
considered "the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed 
expectations... ." Perm Central at 124. In the present case, the Owners have no reasonable 
It is not disputed by the City that building on the lower portion will entail certain expenses that 
the Owners may not have incurred in the upper portion of the Lot, but the Lot is still capable of supporting a 
residence on the lower portion. 
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investment-backed expectations. The Hillside Overlay Ordinance was enacted before Owners 
acquired their Option, and, in fact, preceded the subdivision plat. The Owners Option was 
expressly contingent on gaining approval to build on the upper portion. Because the taking 
allegation rests on an event which was, at best, a contingency, the Owners cannot claim an 
"expectation" in the value of the property. 
Because the Owners here have not alleged, and cannot allege, a deprivation of all 
beneficial use of their property, and because there is no "expectation" which was destroyed, 
their Federal takings claim fails also. 
The Owners' allegations under 42 U.S.C. §1983 are similarly flawed. These claims 
are, by the Owners' assertion, founded upon the factual allegation that the Owners had a 
vested right to build on the upper portion of the lot. As noted above, the trial court's 
decision that the Owners had no vested right was supported by substantial evidence and was 
clearly not an abuse of discretion. Because the Owners obtained no vested rights, their 
§1983 claim also fails. 
Finally, the Owners have argued that the Court committed error by dismissing their 
claims under the Declaratory Judgment Act. If the Court did, in fact, dismiss their claims 
under the Declaratory Judgment Act, it made no difference whatsoever in the outcome of 
their Petition on the merits, and was harmless error. Review under the Declaratory 
Judgment Act and review under U.C.A. §10-9-1001 produce the same results. Under either 
section, the trial court's function in this case would have been to determine whether or not 
the City's actions were illegal. Further, the trial court's legal and factual determinations are 
reviewed in the same manner in this Court. The trial court heard evidence and determined 
22 
whether or not the City acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or illegally. The Owners would have 
had no greater rights under the Declaratory Judgment Act. The Owners' argument presents a 
distinction without difference, therefore, even if the Court's determination on the Motion to 
Dismiss was error, such error was harmless. Hartford Leasing Corp. v. State, 888 P.2d 694 
(Utah App. 1994). 
VI. 
THE OWNERS' CLAIMS REGARDING THE ACTIONS OF THE CITY COUNCIL 
ARE BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA 
In Section V of their opening Appellate Brief, the Owners argue that the decision of 
the Council was arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. In Section VI they argue that the Council's 
decision was based on public clamor, and was, therefore, improper. The trial court 
determined that each of these claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata, and the 
court's determination was correct. 
In the prior District Court action before Judge Stirba, the court determined that the 
decision of the Planning Commission and City Council was not arbitrary and capricious. 
(See Addendum p. 36-39). That judgment was never appealed and stands as a valid 
judgment. In Schaer v. State ex rel. UDOT. 657 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme 
Court set forth the elements of res judicata. In Schaer, the court stated: 
In order for res judicata to apply, both suits must involve the same parties or 
their privies and also the same cause of action; and this precludes the 
relitigation of all issues that could have been litigated as well as those that 
were in fact litigated in the prior action." 
Id. at 1340 (quoting Searle Bros, v. Searle. 588 P.2d 689, 690 (Utah 1978)). 
It is clear that the Owner's petition for review of the City's actions was fully litigated 
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in the first District Court action between the parties, and is therefore, barred in the present 
action. 
While it is not clear that the Owners' "public clamor" allegation was presented in the 
prior case, it is clear that the claim is barred in this action by res judicata principles. In 
their opening appellate brief, the Owners argue that "the only real basis for Draper City 
Council's reversal of the decision to allow Owners to proceed with the construction on the 
east end of their lot was the objection of neighboring landowners who were concerned about 
possible impact on the views from their lots... ." (Brief of Appellant at p. 32, 33). The 
same concerns were presented by the Owners in their original Petition for Review before 
Judge Stirba. In their Memorandum in Support of their Petition for Review in the prior 
case, the Owners allege "the City Council's decision was not made on the merits, but was 
based on an improper factor not provided for in the Hillside Zoning Ordinance-the 
neighbors' concerns about possibly obstructed views." (Addendum p.40, 51). While the 
Owners did not argue specifically the alleged impropriety of basing a decision on "public 
clamor," they clearly presented the same factual basis for an argument that the City's 
decision was arbitrary and capricious. Whether this Court finds that the same claim was 
presented, or that the same claim could have been, and should have been presented, the 
present claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 
VII. 
THE COURT'S DECISION THAT THE CITY'S ACTIONS WERE NOT 
ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS OR ILLEGAL WAS CORRECT 
Even if the Court finds that the Owners claims regarding the propriety of the City's 
decision are not barred by res judicata, the District Court was correct in finding that the 
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City's actions were not arbitrary, capricious or illegal. Section 10-9-1001(3)(b), Utah Code 
Annotated, requires that on appeal from a municipality's land use decision, a district court is 
to "determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal." In this 
case, the reasons for the City Council's decision are clearly demonstrated in the record, and 
are patently not arbitrary, capricious or illegal. 
In the recorded minutes from the City Council meeting of August 23, 1994, 
(Addendum p. 16, 19), paragraph 8.6 reads as follows: 
Paul Lunt made a motion to deny the waiver of the Hillside 
Ordinance and stated that Mr. Brendle will have to build where 
proposed when he bought the lot. The reason is that this would 
be setting a precedence (sic) and if we go against the Hillside 
Ordinance we will have a lot of problems. The motion was 
seconded by Randy Gainer, noting that his reason was because 
Gordon Haight's letter stated "however this concurrence does 
not waive any subdivision covenants, city ordinances, city 
building code or other requirements that may be applicable." A 
roll call vote unanimously approved the motion. 
From the foregoing it is clear that the Council's reason for denying the Owner's 
request on the first appeal to the Council was a desire to remain consistent with the stated 
policy of preventing building on 30% slopes. Such a desire is obviously rational and legally 
justified in view of the City's remarkable growth and the potential for similar requests in the 
future. 
The minutes from the second appeal proceeding before the City Council reflect that 
the Council's decision in that proceeding was based on the same rationale as the first. The 
minutes from the Council's June 13, 1995 meeting, (Addendum p.30, 34), at paragraph 
15.14 read: 
Councilman Gainer made a motion to reverse the decision of the 
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Planning Commission to allow modification of the Hillside 
Ordinance because there is no new evidence from a year ago. 
The Council clearly determined that absent some change in circumstances, their prior 
decision still represented the determination of the Council. There is nothing arbitrary or 
capricious about a City's desire to stay consistent with the stated policy of a newly-adopted 
ordinance. 
Even if the Council were primarily concerned with the objections of the neighboring 
landowners, such a concern is a sufficient basis to deny the Owners their requested 
exception. The Hillside Overlay Ordinance provides that the Commission may allow an 
exception to the Ordinance, if it does not result in "significant harm." The Council 
determined that action that would promote the instability of property values in a new 
development is "significant harm." That determination is entitled to deference. Xanthos v. 
Board of Adjustment, 685 P.2d 1035 (Utah 1984). 
The trial court's decision that the City was not arbitrary or capricious in their 
determination was correct and should be affirmed. 
VIII. 
THE CITY'S DECISION WAS NOT BASED ON "PUBLIC CLAMOR" 
From the facts demonstrated in Section VII, infra, it is clear that the City's decision 
was based upon concerns other than simply the "public clamor" alleged by the Owners. The 
City's desire to remain true to the stated policy of avoiding development in area in excess of 
30% slope is, standing alone, sufficient reason to sustain the determination reached by the 
Council. However, if the Council was concerned with promoting stability of property values 
in the area, such consideration was legally appropriate. 
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IX. 
THE OWNERS' MISREPRESENTATION IS NOT CURED BY THEIR LACK OF 
BAD FAITH 
In Section VII of their Brief on Appeal, the Owners argue that their lack of bad faith 
leads to the legal conclusion that they should be allowed to proceed with building on the 
upper portion of their lot. In support of this assertion, they cite two cases: Commonwealth 
v. Flynn, 344 A.2d 720 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975); and Aranosian Oil Co. v. City of 
Portsmouth, 612 A.2d 357 (N.H. 1992). Both of these cases are inapposite to the situation 
before this Court. In neither of the cited cases did the applicant for a building permit 
misrepresent facts when they had the burden of proving facts to justify an exception. 
The Owners have cast their argument in terms of an apparent lack of bad faith to 
avoid the clear import of their own failure to verify facts they represented to be true. The 
above-cited cases are not contrary authority to that presented in Section II above. Based 
upon the Owners' misrepresentation, the trial court found that the Council had jurisdiction to 
correct the error caused by the Owners. Such a clearly equitable decision was not an abuse 
of discretion, and should not be overturned by this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, the City respectfully requests that this Court 
affirm the decision of the Third District Court. 
DATED this /$// day of November, 1996. 
Attorney for Appefllee City of Draper 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah Code Annotated §78-33-1 et. seq. 
I 
509 JUDICIAL CODE 78-33-13 
has the burden of proving inability to comply with the child 
support order. 
(3) (a) Ifa court finds that an obligor is in contempt of court 
for failure to comply with a child support order, the court 
may, in addition to other available sanctions, suspend the 
driver's license of the obligor and impose conditions for 
reinstatement. 
(b) If a court finds that a custodial parent is in con-
tempt of court for failure to comply with a child visitation 
order, the court may, in addition to other available sanc-
tions, suspend the driver's license of the custodial parent 
and impose conditions for reinstatement. 1996 
CHAPTER 33 
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 
Section 
78-33-1. 
78-33-2. 
78-33-3. 
78-33-4. 
78-33-5. 
78-33-6. 
78-33-7. 
78-33-8. 
78-33-9. 
78-33-10. 
78-33-11. 
78-33-12. 
78-33-13. 
Jurisdiction of district courts — Form — Effect. 
Rights, status, legal relations under instruments 
or statutes may be determined. 
Contracts. 
Suit by fiduciary or representative. 
Court's general powers. 
Discretion to deny declaratory relief. 
Appeals and reviews. 
Supplemental relief. 
Trial of issues of fact. 
Costs. 
Parties. 
Chapter to be liberally construed. 
"Person" defined. 
78-33-1. Jur isdic t ion of district courts — Form — Ef-
fect. 
The district courts within their respective jurisdictions shall 
have power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations, 
whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. No action 
or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground tha t a 
declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for. The declaration 
may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect; and 
such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final 
judgment or decree. 1953 
78-33-2. Rights , status, legal relat ions under instru-
ments or s tatutes may be determined. 
Any person interested under a deed, will or written contract, 
or whose rights, s tatus or other legal relations are affected by 
a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may 
have determined any question of construction or validity 
arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or 
franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, s tatus or other 
legal relations thereunder. 1953 
78-33-3. Contracts. 
A contract may be construed either before or after there has 
been a breach thereof. 1953 
78-33-4. Suit by fiduciary or representat ive . 
Any person interested as or through an executor, adminis-
trator, trustee, guardian or other fiduciary, creditor, devisee, 
legatee, heir, next of kin, or cestui que trust, in the adminis-
tration of a trust , or of the estate of a decedent, an infant, 
lunatic or insolvent, may have a declaration of rights or legal 
relations in respect thereto: 
(1) to ascertain any class of creditors, devisees, lega-
tees, heirs, next of kin or others; or, 
(2) to direct the executors, administrators or trustees 
to do or abstain from doing any particular act in their 
fiduciary capacity; or, 
(3) to determine any question arising in the adminis-
tration of the estate or trust, including questions of 
construction of wills and other writings. 1953 
78-33-5. Court's general powers. 
The enumeration in Sections 78-33-2, 78-33-3 and 78-33-4 
does not limit or restrict the exercise of the general powers 
conferred in Section 78-33-1 in any proceeding where declara-
tory relief is sought, in which a judgment or decree will 
terminate the controversy or remove an uncertainty. 1953 
78-33-6. Discret ion to deny declaratory relief. 
The court may refuse to render or enter a declaratory 
judgment or decree where such judgment or decree, if ren-
dered or entered, would not terminate the uncertainty or 
controversy giving rise to the proceeding. 1953 
78-33-7. Appeals and r ev iews . 
All orders, judgments and decrees under this chapter may 
be reviewed as other orders, judgments and decrees. 1953 
78-33-8. Supplemental relief. 
Further relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree 
may be granted whenever necessary or proper. The applica-
tion therefor shall be by petition to a court having jurisdiction 
to grant the relief. If the application is deemed sufficient, the 
court shall, on reasonable notice, require any adverse party, 
whose rights have been adjudicated by the declaratory judg-
ment or decree, to show cause why further relief should not be 
granted forthwith. 1953 
78-33-9. Trial of issues of fact. 
When a proceeding under this chapter involves the deter-
mination of an issue of fact, such issue may be tried and 
determined in the same manner as issues of fact are tried and 
determined in other civil actions in the court in which the 
proceeding is pending. 1953 
78-33-10. Costs. 
In any proceeding under this chapter the court may make 
such award of costs as may seem equitable and just. 1953 
78-33-11. Parties . 
When declaratory relief is sought all persons shall be made 
parties who have or claim any interest which would be 
affected by the declaration, and no declaration shall prejudice 
the rights of persons not parties to the proceeding. In any 
proceeding which involves the validity of a municipal or 
county ordinance or franchise such municipality or county 
shall be made a party, and shall be entitled to be heard, and if 
a s tatute or state franchise or permit is alleged to be invalid 
the attorney general shall be served with a copy of the 
proceeding and be entitled to be heard. 1953 
78-33-12. Chapter to be l ibera l ly c o n s t r u e d . 
This chapter is declared to be remedial; its purpose is to 
settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with 
respect to rights, status and other legal relations; and is to be 
liberally construed and administered. 1953 
78-33-13. "Person" defined. 
The word "person" wherever used in this chapter, shall be 
construed to mean any person, partnership, joint stock com-
pany, unincorporated association or society, or municipal or 
other corporation of any character whatsoever. 1953 
CHAPTER 34 
EMINENT DOMAIN 
Section 
78-34-1. Uses for which right may be exercised. 
78-34-2. Estates and rights that may be taken. 
SL 
Utah Code Annotated §10-9-1001 
3 
MUNICIPAL LAND USE 10-9-1002 
with respect to property boundary lines, and other permissible forms of land 
use controls. 
(2) The legislative body may refuse to approve or renew any plat or 
subdivision plan, or dedication of any street or other ground, if the deed 
restrictions, covenants, or similar binding agreements running with the land 
for the lots or parcels covered by the plat or subdivision prohibit or have the 
effect of prohibiting reasonably sited and designed solar collectors, clothes-
lines, or other energy devices based on renewable resources from being 
installed on buildings erected on lots or parcels covered by the plat or 
subdivision. 
History: C. 1953, 10-9-901, enacted by L. 
1991, ch. 235, § 62. 
PART 10 
APPEALS AND ENFORCEMENT 
10-9-1001. Appeals. 
(1) No person may challenge in district court a municipality's land use 
decisions made under this chapter or under the regulation made under 
authority of this chapter until that person has exhausted his administrative 
remedies. 
(2) Any person adversely affected by any decision made in the exercise of the 
provisions of this chapter may file a petition for review of the decision with the 
district court within 30 days after the local decision is rendered. 
(3) The courts shall: 
(a) presume that land use decisions and regulations are valid; and 
(b) determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, capricious, 
or illegal. 
History: C. 1953,10-9-1001, enacted by L. ment, effective April 27, 1992, made grammati-
1991, ch. 235, § 53; 1992, ch. 30, § 13. cal changes in Subsection (1). 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 83 Am. Jur. 2d Zoning and C.J.S. — 101A C.J.S. Zoning and Land Plan-
Planning § 1019 et seq. ning § 265 et seq. 
10-9-1002. Enforcement, 
(1) (a) A municipality or any owner of real estate within the municipality in 
which violations of this chapter or ordinances enacted under the authority 
of this chapter occur or are about to occur may, in addition to other 
remedies provided by law, institute: 
(i) injunctions, mandamus, abatement, or any other appropriate 
actions; or 
(ii) proceedings to prevent, enjoin, abate, or remove the unlawful 
building, use, or act. 
(b) A municipality need only establish the violation to obtain the 
injunction. 
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GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 63-30-11 
Subsection (1) and inserted "Eminent Domain" 
and made a related punctuation change in Sub-
section (2). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. 
Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1990). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Development 
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Civil Pro-
cedure, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 166. 
63-30-10.6. Attorneys' fees for records requests. 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for recovery 
of attorneys' fees under Sections 63-2-405 and 63-2-802. 
Notwithstanding Section 63-30-11: 
(a) a notice of claim for attorneys' fees under Subsection (1) may be 
filed contemporaneously with a petition for review under Section 63-2-
404; and 
(b) Sections 63-30-14 and 63-30-19 shall not apply. 
(2) Any other claim under this chapter that is related to a claim for attor-
neys' fees under Subsection (1) may be brought contemporaneously with the 
claim for attorneys' fees or in a subsequent action. 
History: C. 1953, 63-30-10.6, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch. 280, 
1991, ch. 259, § 50; 1992, ch. 280, § 56. § 63 makes L. 1991, ch. 259 effective July 1, 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend- 1992. 
ment, effective July 1, 1992, added the refer-
ence to § 63-2-405 in Subsection (1). 
63-30-11. Claim for injury — Notice — Contents — Service 
— Legal disability. 
( D A claim arises when the statute of limitations that would apply if the 
claim were against a private person begins to run. 
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity, or 
against an employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance 
of his duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority shall 
file a wiitten notice of claim with the entity before maintaining an action, 
regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is character-
ized as governmental. 
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth: 
(i) a brief statement of the facts; 
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and 
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are 
known, 
(b) The notice of claim shall be: 
(i) signed by the person making the claim or that person's agent, 
attorney, parent, or legal guardian; and 
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(ii) directed and delivered to the responsible governmental entity 
according to the requirements of Section 63-30-12 or 63-30-13. 
(4) (a) If the claimant is under the age of majority, or mentally incompe-
tent and without a legal guardian at the time the claim arises, the claim-
ant may apply to the court to extend the time for service of notice of 
claim. 
(b) (i) After hearing and notice to the governmental entity, the court 
may extend the time for service of notice of claim. 
(ii) The court may not grant an extension that exceeds the applica-
ble statute of limitations. 
(c) In determining whether or not to grant an extension, the court shall 
consider whether the delay in serving the notice of claim will substan-
tially prejudice the governmental entity in maintaining its defense on the 
merits. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 11; 1978, ch. 
27, § 5; 1983, ch. 131, § 1; 1987, ch. 75, § 4; 
1991, ch. 76, $ 6. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-
ment, effective April 29, 1991, added the sub-
section designations in Subsection (3)(b) and 
made related changes and deleted "or impris-
oned" after "legal guardian" and made related 
changes in Subsection (4)(a). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Assignment of municipal debt. 
Clear statement of claims required. 
Conditions for right to recover. 
Damages not specified. 
Failure to file claim. 
Notice. 
Sufficiency of notice. 
— Nature of claim asserted. 
Waiver of objections by city. 
Cited. 
Constitutionality. 
Functions of the notice of claim requirement 
in giving the affected governmental entity an 
opportunity to promptly investigate and rem-
edy defects immediately, in avoiding unneces-
sary litigation, and in minimizing difficulties 
which might attend changes in administration 
provide sufficient justification for its imposi-
tion as to governmental but not other tort-fea-
sors, and therefore this section does not deny 
equal protection. Sears v. Southworth, 563 
P.2d 192 (Utah 1977). 
Assignment of municipal debt. 
Assignment directing city to pay debt it owes 
assignor to assignee is not kind of claim re-
quired to be submitted to city in accordance 
with this statute. Cooper v. Holder, 21 Utah 2d 
40, 440 P.2d 15 (1968) (decided under former 
law). 
Clear statement of claims required. 
The purpose of notice-of-claim requirement 
is to require every claimant to state clearly all 
of the elements of his claims to the board of 
commissioners or city council for allowance as 
a condition precedent to his right to sue the 
city and recover his damages in an ordinary 
action. Sweet v. Salt Lake City, 43 Utah 306, 
134 P. 1167 (1913). 
Conditions for right to recover. 
Statutory right to recover is available only 
upon compliance with the condiiions upon 
which right is conferred. One who seeks to en-
force the right must by allegation and proof 
bring himself within the conditions prescribed 
thereby. Hamilton v. Salt Lake City, 99 Utah 
362, 106 P.2d 1028 (1940). 
Damages not specified. 
A claim that stated the time, place and gen-
eral nature of the injury and the sidewalk de-
fect causing it fulfilled the purpose of former 
section even though the amount of damages 
was not stated; since the claim had to be filed 
within thirty days of the injury, the exact 
amount of damages was impossible to ascer-
tain. Spencer v. Salt Lake City, 17 Utah 2d 
362, 412 P.2d 449 (1966) (decided under former 
law). 
Failure to file claim. 
Because no claim was filed as required by 
this section, action to recover moneys expended 
to construct bridge which city had agreed to 
construct was barred. Thomas E. Jeremy Es-
tate v. Salt Lake City, 87 Utah 370, 49 P.2d 
405 (1934). 
Exceptional circumstances were not present 
200 
1 
Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3 
B 
78-2a-2 JUDICIAL CODE 
78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Functions — Filing 
fees. 
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges. The term of appointment 
to office as a judge of the Court of Appeals is until the first general election 
held more than three years after the effective date of the appointment. There-
after, the term of office of a judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and 
commences on the first Monday in January, next following the date of elec-
tion. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon request of the Judicial 
Council, until a successor is appointed and qualified. The presiding judge of 
the Court of Appeals shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per 
annum or fraction thereof for the period served. 
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in panels of three 
judges. Assignment to panels shall be by random rotation of all judges of the 
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection 
of a chair for each panel. The Court of Appeals may not sit en banc. 
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presiding judge from 
among the members of the court by majority vote of all judges. The term of 
office of the presiding judge is two years and until a successor is elected. A 
presiding judge of the Court of Appeals may serve in that office no more than 
two successive terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for an acting 
presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity of the presiding judge. 
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of presiding judge 
by majority vote of all judges of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties 
of a judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge shall: 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels; 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court; 
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of Appeals; and 
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court and the Judicial 
Council. 
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for the Supreme 
Court. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-2, enacted by L. ficeof a judge of the Court of Appeals is 6 years 
1986, ch. 47, § 45; 1988, ch. 248, § 7. and until a successor is appointed and ap-
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- proved under Section 20-1-7.1," into the 
ment, effective April 25, 1988, in Subsection present third and fourth sentences and made 
(1), divided and rewrote the former third sen- minor stylistic changes, 
tence, which read "Thereafter, the term of of-
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs 
and to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Ser-
vice Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of 
Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
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(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of 
the state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims 
department of a circuit court; 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(0 appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involv-
ing a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by 
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, 
except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence 
for a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, in-
cluding, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child 
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four 
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate 
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has 
original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, 
Chapter 46b, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 47, § 46; 1987, ch. 161, § 304; 1988, 
ch. 73, § 1; 1988, ch. 210, § 141; 1988, ch. 
248, § 8; 1990, ch. 80, § 5; 1990, ch. 224, § 3; 
1991, ch. 268, § 22. 
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment by ch. 73, effective April 25, 1988, in-
serted subsection designations (a) and (b) in 
Subsection (1); inserted "resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings" in Subsection (2)(a); 
substituted "state agencies" for "state and local 
agencies" in Subsection (2)(a); substituted "in-
formal adjudicative proceedings of the agen-
cies" for "them" in Subsection (2)(a); deleted 
"notwithstanding any other provision of law" 
at the end of Subsection (2)(a); inserted Subsec-
tion (b); redesignated former Subsections (2Kb) 
to (2)(h) as Subsections (2)(c) to (2)(i); added 
"except those from the small claims depart-
ment of a circuit court" at the end of Subsec-
tion (2)(d); and made minor stylistic changes. 
The 1988 amendment by ch. 210, effective 
April 25, 1988, added Subsection (2)(h) and re-
designated former Subsection (2)(h) as Subsec-
tion (2)(i). 
The 1988 amendment by ch. 248, effective 
April 25, 1988, in Subsection (2)(a), rewrote 
the phrase before "except" which had read "the 
final orders and decrees of state and local agen-
cies or appeals from the district court review of 
them"; deleted "notwithstanding any other 
provision of law" at the end of Subsection 
(2)(a); inserted present Subsection (2Kb); desig-
nated former Subsections (2Kb) to (2)(h) as 
Subsections (2)(c) to (2)(i); and substituted 
"first degree or capital felony" for "first or capi-
tal degree felony" in present Subsection (2)(f). 
The 1990 amendment by ch. 80, effective 
April 23, 1990, rewrote Subsection (2)(g), 
which read "appeals from orders on petitions 
for extraordinary writs involving a criminal 
conviction, except those involving a first de-
gree or capital felony" and made punctuation 
changes in Subsections (2)(h) and (3). 
The 1990 amendment by ch. 224, effective 
April 23, 1990, inserted the subdivision desig-
nation (i) in Subsection (2Kb) and added Sub-
section (2)(b)(ii), and made related stylistic 
changes. 
The 1991 amendment, effective January 1, 
1992, substituted "a court of record" for "dis-
trict court" in Subsection (2)(f). 
Cross-References. — Composition and ju-
risdiction of military court, §§ 39-6-15, 
39-6-16. 
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(a) Prepare and recommend a general plan, street plan, 
zoning map, zoning ordinances, and any other relevant 
proposals or recommendations to the City Council for the 
proper development of the City; 
(b) Prepare and recommend any additions, changes, or 
amendments to the City's general plan, street plan, zoning 
map, zoning ordinances or other relevant items to the City 
Council for the proper development of the City; 
(c) Administer the provisions of the zoning ordinances; 
(d) Recommend subdivision ordinances and regulations and 
amendments thereto to the City Council; 
(e) Recommend approval or denial of subdivision 
applications; 
(f) Advise the City Council on matters requested by the 
City Council; 
(g) Hear or decide any matter that the City Council 
designates, including the approval or denial of, or 
recommendations to approve or deny, conditional use permits; 
(h) Prepare and recommend programs for public improvements 
and the financing thereof to the City Council; and 
(i) Exercise any other powers that are necessary to enable 
the Planning Commission to perform its function or that are 
delegated to it by the City Council. 
9-6-040 Examinations and Surveys. 
The Planning Commission and its authorized agents may enter 
upon any land at reasonable times to make examinations and 
surveys as necessary to enable it to perform its function to 
promote City planning and development. 
9-6-050 Appeals from the Commission. 
Any interested person aggrieved of a final decision of the 
Planning Commission may appeal that decision by filing a written 
appeal stating the grounds therefor within fourteen (14) days 
from the date of the decision or action to the City's Board of 
Adjustment, provided that certain zoning matters including 
conditional use permits and subdivisions shall be appealed to the 
City Council as designated by the City. 
9-6 - 3 
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9-15-030 
"Rational Method," "SCS Curve Number Method," or 
appropriate equivalent. Data provided should include: 
(A) Rainfall depth, duration and distribution; 
(B) Watershed slope and drainage area delineation; 
(C) Land condition of watershed surface; 
(D) Topography of drainage area; 
(E) Description of soil conditions of watershed. 
Erosion calculations shall employ predictions of soil 
loss sheet erosion using the Universal Soil Loss Equation 
or appropriate equivalent. Data to be provided should 
include factors of: 
(F) Rainfall intensity and duration; 
(G) Soil erodibility; 
(H) Land slope and length of slope or topography; 
(I) Condition of the soil surface and land management 
practices in use; 
(J) Surface cover, grass, woodland, crops, pavements, 
etc. 
(d) Final Approval: Final approval will require satisfactory 
compliance with all of the requirements of the preliminary 
review, and compliance with all of the Draper City requirements 
for final plat approval as outlined in the City's Ordinances. 
9-15-040 Development Requirements 
(a) Development in General. Slope areas in excess of 30% may 
not be developed, and no more than thirty percent (30%) of a 
development's slope areas in excess of 30% may be included in 
the area calculation to determine density. The Planning 
Commission may modify this requirement upon finding that: 
(1) No significant harm will result; and 
(2) The proposed modification will result in a more 
functional and improved plan; and 
(3) The developer/builder agrees to comply with any 
conditions or requirements imposed by the Planning Commission 
9-15 - 7 
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to mitigate any adverse effects which may result from the 
proposed modification. 
(b) Subdivision, Single Family Lots: Except as provided in 
Section 9-15-4 a. above, the minimum lot size and yard 
requirements of the underlying zone shall apply except that 
every lot shall have at least 3,500 square feet of "buildable 
area". The buildable area is the area where the slope is 30 
percent or less, and shall be completely contiguous and have a 
minimum dimension of 50 feet. Lots shall allow dwelling 
structures to be located within 250 feet from a public street. 
All main and accessory buildings shall be built within the 
buildable area. 
(c) PUDs and Dwelliner Groups: Except as provided in Section 
9-15-040 a. above, the density limitations of the underlying 
zone shall apply except that all buildings shall be built upon 
the "buildable area; consult Chapter 7 of this Title for PUD 
density allowance. All dwelling units shall be located within 
250 feet of a public street, or a private street that has been 
approved by the Planning Commission. For PUDs in areas where 
the Hillside Overlay District applies, the minimum requirement 
for common open space shall be 20 percent of the total project 
area. 
(d) Maximum Impervious Material Coverage: The total maximum 
allowable coverage by impervious material within a project or 
portion of a project within the Hillside Overlay District shall 
not exceed 35 percent of the total project area. Areas of roofs 
and driveways will be estimated and included in the total 
impervious surface area. 
9-15-050 Development Standards 
(a) Scope: It is intended by this Chapter that the 
development standards and provisions, as set forth herein, shall 
be required in connection with all building and construction in 
the Hillside Overlay District. 
(b) Grading Drainage and Erosion: The area of the watershed 
shall be used to determine the amount of storm water runoff 
generated before and after construction. 
(1) A grading and drainage report shall be prepared in 
which the developer will describe the methods intended to be 
employed to control the erosion increase while in 
construction. 
(2) The developer/builder is responsible for interim 
stabilization of all disturbed areas during the period of 
9-15 - 8 
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The Council would like the agreement to include the following: the 
developer hereby agrees to dedicate or donate and convey to the City, free 
and clear, an acceptable undeveloped parcel consisting of at least 22 acres 
designated for an equestrian center; and the land needed for a boarding 
barn and restaurant may be deducted from this 22 acres and retained in 
private ownership. The developer agrees to do the grading, fencing, and 
put in the rings. 
Another concern is the golf course. If the developer decides to sell, the 
City will get the first right of refusal. 
Paragraph 4.1.1 discusses the fact that only 10 model homes can be built 
until Highland Drive is completed to the 1-15 freeway interchange. The 
developers disagree with this. They maintain that there is a bond in place 
to finish the road, and if the City needs to they can call their bond and 
have the road completed. 
7.5 Several residents spoke in opposition to the development. They are 
opposed to the development and the road and they want a study done for 
noise abatement. 
7.6 Clair Huff noted that the discussion was good and the agreement still 
needs a lot of work, therefore, he made a motion to continue approval of 
the agreement. The motion was seconded by Jeff Rasmussen. Voting was 
unanimous in the affirmative. 
7.7 Paul Lunt asked that this be on the next agenda for the public meeting as 
an action item. 
8.0 ACTION ITEM: Approval of a waiver of the Hillside Ordinance for 
Stephen E. Brendle on Lot 304 at The Cove at Bear Canvon Phase HI. 
8.1 Jeff Rasmussen noted that the City Council took a field trip to the site. 
8.2 Paul Glauser explained that the issues were presented last week in the 
study meeting. Prior to that meeting they met with the Planning 
Commission and asked them to look at the Hillside Ordinance and not 
enforce the 30% development restrictions. The Planning Commission did 
not agree, therefore, Mr. Brendle wants the Council to overturn this 
decision. 
8.3 Mr. Meyers presented a model of lot. 304 showing the bottom half of the 
II 
City Council Minutes 
August 23, 1994 
Page 6 
lot. They purchased the lot on the condition that they could build on the 
top half of the lot They contacted Gordon Haight and he stated that they 
needed a plot plan- Gordon agreed that it would be better to build on the 
top half of the lot. Then they went to the Planning Department and got a 
building permit. They surveyed, laid it out, excavated, dug the footings, 
formed the footings and had the steel in the footings when a neighbor 
complained and then the job was shut down. They did not buy the lot 
until the building permit was issued. The subdivision was developed under 
the Hillside Ordinance. The purpose of the Hillside Ordinance is to 
prevent erosion and to preserve the natural vegetation, and maintaining 
the hillside in its natural state. He pointed out exhibit 13 on page 9 which 
lists three items that must be satisfied in order to continue to build: 1. No 
significant harm will result; and 2. The proposed modification will result in 
a more functional and improved plan; and 3. The developer/builder agrees 
to comply with any conditions and requirements imposed by the Planning 
Commission to mitigate any adverse effects which may result from the 
proposed modification. The developer stated that the plat approved by the 
City is not the same as the actual conditions are. He pointed out on the 
model how the driveway will have to be cut into the hillside in order to get 
access into the house. He feels that the placement of the house on the 
bottom of the lot violates the intent of the Hillside Ordinance. It will scar 
the hill and remove more vegetation. Mr. Haight, Mr. Glauser, and Mr. 
Campbell all concur that the home should be placed on top of lot 304 
because it is more functional, safer, and will have less impact. If the house 
is built on the bottom of the lot, grading will be necessary due to sandy, 
gravely soil. Retaining walls will also be necessary. It appears that 
building on top will not have these problems. There will be no impact on 
adjacent property. The house fits in and blends into the hillside. 
8.4 Greg Phillips addressed the legal issues. His client came to the City and 
did everything he thought he should do before closing on the lot. When 
you rely on the City and do everything you can and the City says go ahead, 
the City may be equitably estopped from changing the position. If you 
look at the different standard in the Hillside Ordinance, the minimal harm 
standard, there is going to be more harm by placing the home on the 
bottom of the lot. The harm has already been done on top, the excavation 
is done and the footings are done. It will create more harm if they are 
forced to change. The views of neighbors are not a proper consideration 
under the Hillside Ordinance. 
8.5 Jerry Gerber is the owner of lot 312. She bought her lot with the 
understanding that Draper City would not allow homes to be built on the 
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30% grade. The lots were priced accordingly. She went to Wasatch 
Pacific and Terry Diehl showed her a letter where the committee had 
approved Mr. Meyers request to build if he received a variance. At the 
Planning Commission Meeting, Mr. Diehl said he did not approve the 
building to be placed on the top of the lot. Development in Draper is 
growing fast. The City will face this many times. The ordinances are to 
guide builders and to help protect the landowners who bought their lots in 
good faith. 
8.6 Craig Cazier owns lots 316 and 317. They bought two lots so no one could 
obstruct the view to the north. The house sites were put on the plat 
before any lots were purchased. It was approved as a Draper subdivision. 
Mr. Brendle had the same plat as Mr. Cazier. Money is not the object. 
Craig noted that he has read the Hillside Ordinance and it states that no 
building can be put on a 30% slope. There are a lot of ways to put in 
driveways and retaining walls without moving too much vegetation. If the 
home is built on top, the backfill will destroy all the vegetation and there 
will have to be a retaining wall built for the fill, or the property will have 
to be sloped out. Mr. Cazier's home will be built down in and this home 
will obstruct his view to the north. The Hillside Ordinance says that no 
building can be done on a 30% slope and we should stick to it. 
8.7 Paul Lunt made a motion to deny the waiver of the Hillside Ordinance and 
stated that Mr. Brendle will have to build where proposed when he bought 
the lot. The reason is that this would be setting a precedence and if we go 
against the Hillside Ordinance we will have a lot of problems. The motion 
was seconded by Randy Gainer, noting that his reason was because 
Gordon Haight's letter stated, "however this concurrence does not waive 
any subdivision covenants, city ordinances, city building code or other 
requirements that may be applicable". A roll call vote unanimously 
approved the motion. 
9.0 QUESTIONS FOR MAYOR AND COUNCIL. 
9.1 Jeff Rasmussen thanked the Council for the opportunity to act as Mayor 
Pro Tern. 
9.2 Dave Campbell discussed items to be scheduled on the upcoming agendas. 
9.3 Clair Huff made a motion to adjourn at 9:53 P.M. The motion was 
seconded by Randy Gainer. Voting was unanimous in the affirmative. 
n 
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be enclosed by a six-foot high fence and motion detection 
security lighting. 
6 Tom Suchoski made a motion to recommend approval of a 
Conditional-Use Permit to construct a cellular communications 
tower on approximately 3,100 square feet of leased property in 
a C-3 zone with the following conditions: Staff Report dated 
April 13, 1995; and that the tower have a maximum limit of 60-
f eet. The motion was seconded by Don McCormick and passed 
unanimously on a roll call vote. 
0 ACTION ITEM 
Reconsideration of the request to build a house in 30% slope 
area in the Hillside Overlay for Stephen Brendle on Lot 304 of 
Cove at Bear Canyon Subdivision. 
1 Paul Glauser said this matter came before the Planning 
Commission last summer and was denied. The City Council 
upheld the findings of the Planning Commission and also denied 
the request. The applicant challenged the City's actions in 
court and the judge ruled in the City's favor. They are again 
requesting that they be allowed to build a house in a 30% 
slope area because there is no longer opposition to their 
building in the proposed area. 
2 Dick Maires said this request is subject to the Hillside 
Ordinance and there are extenuating circumstances. He feels 
strongly the Planning Commission should take another look at 
the proposal. Mr. Maires stated the Planning Commission has 
the authority to modify the Hillside Ordinance if no 
significant harm results and if the proposed modification will 
result in a more functional and improved plan; that the 
developer and the builder agree to comply with any 
restrictions. 
City Engineer Gordon Haight was contacted to find out what was 
required in order to build a house on the top area and they 
were given certain criteria. Mr. Haight looked at the lot and 
commented it would be better to put the house on top. Mr. 
Maires received a building permit and started construction. 
The job was stopped because a lot owner complained, who has 
since turned his lot back to the developer. The developer has 
indicated he backs the location of the house and will make 
sure anyone buying a piece of property is aware of the 
situation. 
Mr. Maires explained a home on the bottom portion of the lot 
does everything contrary to what the Planning Commission is 
trying to do with the Hillside Ordinance. The upper part of 
the lot would not require any more excavation than has been 
done and the vegetation in front and sides of the house will 
be maintained to the street. The slope from the street to the 
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front of the house is 26%, the south side slope is 32%, the 
north side slope is 30%. He said the staff is unanimous in 
their concurrence that the location on the upper end of the 
property would be best. 
3 Paul Glauser spoke to Terry Diehl and was told he would notify 
any future buyers of the change in. building plans. The 
developer stated this home is hundreds of feet from any homes 
being planned at this time. 
4 Paul Jones made a motion to approve Mr. Maires' request to 
build the home as proposed on Lot 3 04 of Cove at Bear Canyon 
Subdivision, because the understanding of the Planning 
Commission is that there will be no significant harm caused by 
building the home at the proposed location; the proposed 
modification will result in a more functional and improved 
plan; and there are no surrounding property owners who have 
different expectations of the lot, that would interfere with 
going ahead with the building. The motion was seconded by 
Dale Howlett and passed on a vote of 5-1 with Tom Suchoski 
voting no. 
5 Tom Suchoski stated, as a point of interest, they have a very 
difficult time finding no significant harm in this when the 
previous motion found significant harm. Either the Planning 
Commission contradicts themselves, or they cannot make that 
finding. Paul Glauser said they can find that because the 
view is no longer the issue, that was the primary harm. Mr. 
Suchoski said the significant harm was erosion and damage to 
the environment. 
6 Ross Richins voted against it previously because of the 
precedence, and felt the home could be modified in order to 
use the lower part of the lot. He stated he is convinced now 
that the upper part of the lot is the best place to build. 
7 Paul Jones said perhaps it would be better to state the 
justification for the reason as being that, different 
information has been submitted, and the change in the cut in 
the slope of the lower portion as a result of the road cut of 
the actual construction versus the design. Mr. Diehl 
indicated early on that the road was constructed according to 
the plans and, as far as the information he had available, it 
was correct for the lower portion of the property. The lower 
site would not be buildable given its current configurations 
and there is less environmental harm in the upper portion of 
the lot at this point of time. Paul Jones said that is what 
he implied by his statement that the least amount of impact on 
the hillside would be to build the home on the upper part of 
the lot. 
10 
<££ 
Robin Frank made a motion to extend the meeting past 10:00 p.m. 
The motion was seconded and passed on a vote of 5-1 with Tom 
Suchoski voting no. 
8.0 PUBLIC HEARING 
CONDITIONAL-USE PERMIT 
Marie Osborne is requesting approval of a Conditional-Use 
Permit to allow the operation of a beauty shop in an existing 
residential structure located in an RR-43 zone at 11580 South 
700 West. 
8.1 Marie Osborne explained she is proposing a business in her 
home with no structure change. She had a shop built in for 
the purpose of providing a service for her family. She said 
there is adequate parking and does not feel she would disturb 
anyone. She does not plan on having a sign. There is a 
separate entrance on the northwest side of the house. 
8.2 Don McCormick asked the applicant if she agreed with Staff 
Recommendation #3 regarding the hours of operation. Mrs. 
Osborne asked that the hours be extended from 6:30 a.m. to 
9:00 p.m. 
8.3 Chairman Kimball opened the public hearing. 
8.4 Suellen Rifkin lives across the street from the applicant and 
is in support. She feels many people have this type of 
business in their home that never comply with City Ordinances. 
She does not have a problem with adjusting the hours of 
operation. 
8.5 Sandra Ball has no problem with the proposed home occupation. 
8.6 Nicole Davis said she is very supportive of home businesses. 
Signage would be a concern to her. 
8.7 Tom Suchoski made a motion to recommend approval of a 
Conditional-Use Permit for a beauty salon located in an 
existing residence at 11580 South 700 West, subject to the 
following conditions: recommendations of the staff report 
dated April 13, 1995, with the exception that Staff 
Recommendation #3 be modified to extend the hours from 6:00 
a.m. until 9:00 p.m.; and if the light traffic is more than 
anticipated, the Conditional-Use Permit could be subject to 
review. The motion was seconded by Dale Howlett and passed 
unanimously on a roll call vote. 
9.0 ACTION ITEM 
Further consideration of American Heritage Apartments at approx. 
11800 South State Street (continued from previous meetings). 
11 
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1995-06-08pc. PLANNING COMMISSION MINUTES 
MINUTES OF THE DRAPER CITY PLANNING COMMISSION HELD JUNE 8, 1995, 
IN THE COUNCIL CHAMBERS OF DRAPER CITY HALL. 
MEMBERS PRESENT: Chairman Lyn Kimball, Tom Suchoski, Dale 
Howlett, Ross Richins, Paul Jones. 
OTHERS PRESENT: Paul Glauser, Bruce Talbot, Rob Smetana, Holly 
Barney, Craig Cazier, Carry Cazier, Jeri 
Gerber, Max Gerber, Mike Burrows, Mark Wilkey, 
Dick Maires, Bev Stats, Chris Gaminrovias, 
David Fairbourn, Scott Waldron, Wayde Mackay, 
McKay Douglas, Jacob Douglas, Paul Frampton, 
Grant Beagley, Mark Wetzer, Don Gunn, Loraine 
Sundquist, Norman Squires, Bob Drennan, Suellen 
Riffkin, Paula Williams, Guilford Raud, Sherry 
O'Meara, David Jenson, George Richards, Mark 
Wilkey, Stephen Brendle, and Linda Dunlavy. 
FIELD TRIP - 6:00 P.M. 
The Commissioners visited sites on the agenda. 
BUSINESS MEETING - 7:00 P.M. 
Chairman Kimball opened the meeting at 7:10 p.m., and welcomed 
those attending. 
1.0 ACTION ITEM 
APPROVAL of the minutes from May 18, 1995, and May 25, 1995, 
meetings. 
1.1 Dale Howlett made a motion to approve the minutes of May 18 
and 25, 1995 as amended. The motion was seconded by Ross 
Richins and passed unanimously. 
2.0 ACTION ITEM 
APPROVAL of the June 8, 1995, Consent Calendar. 
2.1 Dale Howlett made a motion to approve the June 8, 1995, 
Consent Calendar. The motion was seconded by Tom Suchoski 
and passed unanimously on a roll call vote. 
3.0 ACTION ITEM 
Reconsideration of the request to build a house in 30% slope 
area, lot 3 04 of COVE AT BEAR CANYON SUBDIVISION. 
3.1 Paul Glauser stated that originally the Planning Commission 
and City Council turned down a request from Mr. Brendle to 
build a house on lot 3 04, Cove at Bear Canyon Subdivision. 
In March 1995 Mr. Brendle and the developer of the 
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subdivision represented to the City that opposition by lot 
owners to the east to building a house no longer existed. 
The Planning Commission granted Mr. Brendle permission to 
build a house in the 30% slope portion of lot 304 because 
there was no opposition. Since that time the City has been 
approached by owners of lots in the area stating they do 
oppose the construction of the home on the 30% portion of 
the lot and that it was misrepresented that they did not 
oppose the matter. The City Attorney advised that the 
matter be reconsidered because of allegations that the 
Planning Commission received incorrect information on April 
20, 1995, and the decision was influenced by that 
information. 
2 Mark Wilkey, attorney for the applicant, stated the 
applicant contends that the Planning Commission lacks 
jurisdiction to reconsider this matter. It was properly 
brought before the Commission on April 20, 1995, and passed 
on a 5-1 vote. He further stated all of the factors set 
forth in the Hillside Ordinance were properly considered. 
The Ordinance allows a 3 0-day period for appeal and none 
were filed. The applicant has poured the foundation and are 
into the project over $100,000. He feels they have a vested 
right to proceed. In the event the matter is reconsidered, 
the applicant will seek an injunction to allow completion of 
the project. 
3 Chairman Kimball stated the matter would be heard on the 
basis that the information used to render a decision may not 
have been the information needed. 
4 Max Gerber has opposed the proposal since it was originally 
heard by the Planning Commission. The applicant was told to 
remove the forms and restore the slope. Everything that was 
submitted was misrepresented. The lot will affect the next 
lot because it has the same slope problem and it will effect 
his view and the lots were sold as view lots. 
5 Jerry Gerber said they were not notified that Mr. Brendle 
intended to continue building. She would like to see 
everyone secure in what they buy. 
6 Craig Cazier said he opposed this matter from the beginning. 
He was not notified that the matter was going to be heard by 
the Planning Commission a second time. He opposes it 
because it is going to ruin the entire subdivision. He 
feels the hillside could be beautiful. 
7 Steve Brendle said he has tried to do everything required. 
He was issued a building permit and started construction. 
He explained the developer told him there was no opposition 
to the project and told him he should go back to the 
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Planning Commission with a letter containing the information 
he received from the developer. Mr. Brendle asked that the 
Planning Commission allow him to finish building his home. 
3.8 Pamela Richardson stated Mr. Brendle builds quality homes 
and feels it will add a positive addition to the 
subdivision. She does not feel Mr. Brendle should be 
penalized and should be decided on a case-by-case basis. 
3.9 Ernie Floyd recently purchased lot 314. He suggested that 
the pitch of the roof could be changed to make the house 
four feet less above street level than is currently planned. 
3.10 Terry Diehl stated he is the developer of the subdivision 
and asked to go on record that he has never represented 
whether there would be opposition or not. He did represent 
that originally there was opposition. He said he did not 
have any lots across the street sold and the Gerber's were 
selling their lot and that is why he did not feel there was 
any opposition. 
3.11 Mark Wilkey stated he does not feel a precedent has been 
set, but the Hillside Ordinance requires a case by case 
consideration. Technically the City has felt it would be 
better to build on the top part of the lot. He feels this 
is Draper City's problem since there was no public notice 
given, and his client should not be penalized. 
3.12 Mr. Cazier stated the Planning Commission heard it once 
before and denied it. There was misinformation given to the 
Planning Commission. 
3.13 Mr. Brendle stated he would consider the change of pitch for 
the roof after he studied it. 
3.14 Ross Richins stated he changed his original vote on this 
matter on the basis that the upper location was the best 
location for the home. Paul Glauser said from a technical 
standpoint the top location is better, but that is not the 
only consideration. Mr. Richins voted against the initial 
proposal because he felt the house could be modified and the 
bottom lot used. Paul Glauser said some kind of house could 
be built on the lower portion of the lot to mitigate the 
problems with the lot. 
3.15 Tom Suchoski stated he has voted against this issue both 
times. The second time it came before the Planning 
Commission he did not feel the developer had done anything 
to address the consideration of a house on the bottom lot. 
The upper portion is a better location for that specific 
house. 
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3.16 Chairman Kimball said as he looked at the area, it is his 
opinion that if the house were built it would not 
significantly affect the view of surrounding homes even if 
it maintained the 16 feet above the elevation of the road. 
A precedence would not be set since the Hillside Ordinance 
is considered on a case by case ba^is. Those that have 
purchased lots are not guaranteed an unobstructed view. 
Chairman Kimball said if he were voting he would allow the 
building to resume. 
3.17 Paul Jones said the Planning Commission should not be 
dealing with the issue of views but only with the 
suitability of building. Dale Howlett agreed the Planning 
Commission cannot guarantee views. 
3.18 Ross Richins stated the information he has indicates the 
upper portion of the lot is the best place to build. He 
would not mind putting a restriction on the builder to try 
to incorporate lowering the pitch of the roof to give the 
added four feet. 
3.19 Tom Suchoski said there is an Ordinance in place that states 
that homes are not built on slopes greater than 30%. He 
could justify building on a slope of greater than 30% if it 
were in the City's interest to allow the development to 
occur, otherwise he feels that a precedence is being set. 
He does not feel the lot is buildable. Mr. Suchoski also 
stated no alternatives were presented to the Commission to 
make building on the lower part of the lot acceptable. 
3.20 Dale Howlett made a motion to stay with the decision made at 
the last hearing and allow the house to built on the upper 
portion of the lot because there is less disturbance of the 
slope and natural vegetation than there would be if building 
was done on the lower portion of the lot; it would be a 
better location for a house; and when the subdivision was 
platted, the lot was considered a buildable lot at that 
time. The motion was seconded by Ross Richins and passed on 
a vote of 3-1 with Tom Suchoski voting no. 
4.0 ACTION ITEM 
Recommendation of Sign Ordinance (continued from previous 
meetings). 
4.1 Rob Smetana reviewed the following changes: a section on 
'Violations and Enforcement' was completed with wording from 
the City Attorney; maximum height on temporary signs was 
raised from six to seven feet; a section was added regarding 
off-premise residential development direction signs; non-
profit was added to signs for events requiring a sign permit 
to cover such items as the Utah Homeshow and to allow one 
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on-site and three off-site signs per event; the amortization 
schedule lists three options. 
2 Paul Glauser said a sign could be brought into compliance if 
there was a change in ownership of the property or business, 
but it needs to be specific. 
3 Tom Suchoski said the change should be made when the 
business is changed. 
4 Dale Howlett stated he would like to delete option #3 on the 
amortization schedule. He does not feel there are very many 
nonconforming signs at the present time and it would not be 
adverse to the City to allow those signs to stay. 
5 Ross Richins feels the playing field should be level and 
that everyone should be equal. Mr. Richins prefers the 4-6 
year amortization schedule. 
6 Paul Jones suggested, if changes were made to the building, 
the owner be required to bring their sign into conformity. 
7 Paul Glauser explained that the City has a section in the 
ordinance dealing with nonconforming uses that states, if 
changes are made regarding the fundamental use of the 
building or increase the value, they have to meet all 
current standards. Paul Jones stated he would like the 
nonconforming clause to apply to the signs. 
8 Dale Howlett said the amortization schedule is going to 
create a climate of lawsuits and there will be a hard time 
enforcing the ordinance. He does not feel right asking 
people to take down signs that the City has approved. 
9 Chairman Kimball said those that currently have signs 
obtained a permit for their sign. The current applicants 
understand the changes that are being considered. 
10 Tom Suchoski agreed with Mr. Howlett's comments on 
nonconforming signs. He would like to have the stipulation 
that on a change of business or a major remodel of the 
business, nonconforming signs would have to be modified. 
11 Paul Jones said there are minor changes needed in the 
definition section and that all definitions should be 
included in one place. 
12 Tom Suchoski said he feels there needs to be more than two 
temporary residential development signs in some situations. 
Paul Jones suggested that two be a standard amount, but 
people be allowed to apply for more. Paul Glauser said 
language could be included stating staff could consider 
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Minutes, Draper City Council, June 13, 1995 
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1995-06-13CC. CITY COUNCIL MINUTES 
MINUTES OF THE CITY COUNCIL MEETING HELD JUNE 13, 1995 IN THE 
COUNCIL CHAMBERS OF DRAPER CITY HALL. 
MEMBERS PRESENT: Mayor Elaine Redd, Councilman Randy Gainer, 
Councilman Clair Huff, Councilman Paul Lunt, 
Councilman Jeff Rasmussen, and Councilman Darrell 
Smith. 
OTHERS PRESENT: Paul Glauser, Barbara Sadler, Mike Mehraban, 
Jerry Blair, Ron Smith, Jim Day, Joyce Day, Pat 
Smith, Jeri Gerber, Lyle McAllister, Doug Bedke, 
Rob Allen, Debbie Coon, Lynn Coon, Terry Diehl, 
Sue Whittington, Jer^y T. Walton, Richard Walton, 
Rick Smith, Ben '"Williams, Paula Williams, 
Beatrice Avery, Shelly O'Meara, Craig Cazier, Dee 
Christiansen, Cliff Hales, LaRae Hales, and Linda 
Dunlavy. 
Councilman Lunt made a motion to close the executive session. The 
motion was seconded by Councilman Huff and passed unanimously. 
1.0 Welcome. 
1.1 Mayor Redd began the meeting at 7:15 p.m., and welcomed those 
attending. 
2.0 Pledge of Allegiance. 
2.1 The Pledge of Allegiance was led by Dee Christiansen. 
3.0 Prayer. 
3.1 The prayer was given by Joyce Day. 
4.0 Approval of Minutes for June 6, 1995. 
4.1 Councilman Huff moved that the minutes of June 6, 1995, be 
approved as amended. The motion was seconded by Councilman 
Smith and passed on a voice vote with Councilman Gainer 
abstaining. 
5.0 Oath of Office for Doug Bedke, new member of the Board of 
Adjustments and Clark Naylor, new member of the Parks, Trails 
and Open Space Committee. 
5.1 Mr. Doug Bedke was sworn in as a member of the Board of 
Adjustments by City Recorder Barbara Sadler. 
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14.1 This item will be continued to a later meeting. 
15.0 ACTION ITEM: Appeal of June 8, 1995 Planning Commission 
decision on the request to build a house in a 30% slope area 
at Lot 3 04 of COVE AT BEAR CANYON SUBDIVISION. 
15.1 Paul Glauser stated the history of this issue is documented in 
the staff report. It was heard last year and was denied. A 
new application was submitted this year on the basis that 
conditions had changed, which may change the outcome of the 
decision. Last week the Planning Commission heard this matter 
and approved it on a 3-1 vote. The following day an appeal 
was made by a neighboring property owner. Notifications were 
mailed to the twelve known owners of lots in Phase III of this 
subdivision regarding this meeting as a courtesy. 
15.2 Mark Wilke, attorney for Mr. Brendle, stated he does not feel 
that the City Council has jurisdiction to hear this matter 
which was resolved earlier. At the April 20, 1995 time frame 
there was a two-week period of appeal. It was reconsidered 
last week over their objection and passed again. His client 
has put substantial money into the property and feels he has 
a vested right to go forward and develop the lot. 
15.3 Craig Cazier stated he owns lots 316 and 317. He was in 
attendance to oppose this matter the last time it was heard by 
the City Council as well as attending the Planning Commission 
last week in opposition. Mr. Cazier feels a precedent has 
been set by the Planning Commission. The Ordinance states 
there is no building on a 30% slope. When the lots were 
purchased it was detailed as to where the houses were to go on 
the lots. Mr. Cazier feels that the values of the property 
will decrease if this is allowed. 
15.4 Councilman Rasmussen said Mr. Cazier had stated he purchased 
view lots and was told where a home could be built on those 
lots. Mr. Cazier said Mr. Brendle's lot was one of the 
cheaper lots in the subdivision and was designated to have a 
home built on the lower street. Gerber7 s were the first 
people to purchase their lot and Mr. Cazier was second or 
third. They were told the houses were not to be built in a 
3 0% slope and every lot showed the area where a home could be 
built. 
15.5 Jeri Gerber stated she owns lot 312 and bought the lot 
expecting that when it was filed with the County it was legal 
and that homes where not allowed to be built on a 30% slope. 
Mrs. Gerber stated the lot was priced as it was because of the 
view. She feels the Hillside Ordinance is part of orderly 
growth in Draper. She also stated that last year the Planning 
Commission and the City Council instructed Mr. Brendle to 
remove his forms and to study new plans and he did neither. 
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He was told that if he continued construction it was at his 
risk. Mrs. Gerber feels she has as much invested as Mr. 
Brendle. This matter was refused by the Planning Commission 
and the City Council last year. It was brought back to the 
Planning Commission because of a letter from the developer 
stating there was no opposition. She does not know why the 
developer said there was no opposition when he knew the 
feelings of the Gerbers and Caziers. She suggested Mr. 
Brendle follow the outline he was given by the Planning 
Commission and City Council last year. 
6 Councilman Rasmussen asked if there was a significant 
difference in the price of the Gerber and Cazier lots and Mr. 
Brendle's lot. Mrs. Gerber stated she believes Mr. Brendle 
paid $55,000 for his lot; the Gerbers paid $90,500; Mr. Cazier 
paid $95,000 and $115,000 for his lots. 
7 Pam Richards stated she owns Lot 310 and did not know there 
was a pecking order depending on how much was paid for the 
lot. There were mistakes from the beginning and Ms. Richards 
feels the applicant was given approval by the Planning 
Commission and that approval should be set in stone. She also 
feels that views cannot be guaranteed in a subdivision. 
8 Councilman Smith asked Mr. Brendle if he was given the same 
direction as other property on where the house should be 
built. Mr. Brendle stated that originally his offer on the 
property was contingent upon the house being located on the 
upper portion of the lot. Mr. Brendle stated he bought the 
lot after the road was cut. 
9 Mr. Cazier said there is one sewer lateral and water meter for 
each lot and they are located on the lower street in Mr. 
Brendle's lot. 
10 Mr. Maires said the lot was bought on the option of being 
able to get the home site moved from the bottom of the lot 
to the top. Gordon Haight and Lee Holmstead were contacted 
and they approved moving the home to the upper portion of 
the lot. Councilman Lunt stated the City Engineer and 
Building Inspector cannot approve that kind of request. A 
building permit was issued and the work was later stopped. 
Both the Planning Commission and City Council upheld that 
decision. At the last Planning Commission meeting the 
request was approved. He explained that the situation on 
the lot is entirely different than the original plat shows. 
He also stated that lot prices have dropped at this time on 
remaining lots and the price should not be a consideration. 
He feels the decision from the Planning Commission was 
based on the Hillside Ordinance. If the house is built on 
the lower portion of the lot the driveway will have a slope 
of 20% which is in violation of Draper City requirements. 
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Mr. Maires said they put an option on the lot but did not 
purchase it until after they were issued a building permit. 
15.11 Councilman Gainer asked if the lot was purchased knowing 
the sewer lateral and water stub were at the bottom of the 
lot. Mr. Brendle stated he did not think it was an issue. 
Councilman Smith moved that the meeting be extended to 10:15 p.m. 
The motion was seconded by Councilman Smith and passed unanimously. 
15.12 Mr. Brendle explained the site in question. He stated he 
has tried to do everything right. The City of Draper 
issued a building permit and he then closed on the land. 
The neighbor that complained is 400 feet away and does not 
even see his property. Mr. Brendle stated the requests 
regarding the Hillside Ordinance are looked at on a case by 
case basis. He is planning on building a $455,000 house 
and feels it will help the subdivision. He stated he has 
tried to discuss the matter with Mr. Cazier and he will not 
talk to him. The people directly across from his property 
do not have a problem with him building the house. Mr. 
Brendle said he and Paul Glauser were both told by Terry 
Diehl that there was no opposition to the request. He told 
the developer to take the property back and Mr. Diehl 
suggested he go to the City Council again because there* was 
no more opposition. Mr. Brendle asked about Craig Cazier 
and Mr. Diehl said he was not a problem. Mr. Brendle said 
he has spent over $100,000 and has committed an additional 
$150,000. He was told this was a buildable lot. The staff 
was in favor of moving the location of the house to the 
upper portion of the lot. He requested that he be allowed 
to complete his house. 
15.13 Paul Glauser explained Lee Holmstead issued a building 
permit to the applicant, the forms for the footings were 
set, and at that time the City received complaints from the 
neighbors. Mr. Holmstead was requested to issue a stop 
work order on the house at that time. Mr. Glauser said a 
certified letter was sent to Mr. Brendle stating the matt 
er was being reconsidered by the Planning Commission and 
suggested if he proceed it was at his own risk. The forms 
were set and the concrete poured after he was told he was 
proceeding at his own risk. 
15.14 Councilman Gainer made a motion to reverse the decision of 
the Planning Commission to allow modification of the 
Hillside Ordinance because there is no new evidence from a 
year ago. The original property owners of the upper lots 
purchased those lots for a reason and also have a vested 
right. The motion was seconded by Councilman Lunt and 
passed unanimously on a roll call vote. 
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16.0 QUESTIONS FOR MAYOR AND COUNCIL. 
16.1 Councilman Rasmussen felt Mr. Arnold was a person with 
integrity with a desire to do what is right in the wrong spot. 
He asked that Debby Wilson let him know the feeling of the 
Council and help him in locating a commercial site. 
16.2 Joyce Day asked where the water is coming from for the 
Pinnacle Point apartments and the South Mountain area. 
Councilman Rasmussen stated he would like to see the City 
install a line under 1-15 to furnish the water. Mayor Redd 
stated the City will be providing water. She also stated 
South Mountain is committed to revegetate and is currently 
developing retention ponds. 
16.3 Wally Stewart said a new water line is being installed along 
the west frontage road and dirt has been left south of the 
entrance to Greenfield Farms which makes it difficult to see 
any traffic coming from the prison unless you enter the road. 
Paul Glauser will check on the situation. 
17.0 ADJOURNMENT. 
17.1 Councilman Lunt made a motion to continue the executive 
session. The motion was seconded by Councilman Gainer and 
passed unanimously. The meeting adjourned at 10:20 p.m. 
Submitted by: 
Linda Dunlavy 
Minutes Secretary. 
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MICHAEL Z. HAYES - 1432 
MICHAEL J. MAZURAN - 213 6 
MAZURAN & HAYES, P.C. 
1245 East Brickyard Road, Suite 250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: (801) 484-6600 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
STEPHEN E. BRENDLE, an : 
individual and RICHARD L. : 
MAIRES, an individual : RULING AND ORDER 
Plaintiff, : Civil No. 940905958AA 
vs. : Judge Anne M. Stirba 
THE CITY OF DRAPER, a Utah : 
municipality : 
Defendant. : 
oooOooo 
Plaintiff's Motion for Review came on for hearing on 
Monday, March 6, 1995, at the hour of 2:00 p.m., Plaintiff's were 
present and represented by their counsel Gregory D. Phillips and 
Defendant, Draper City, was represented by its counsel, Michael Z. 
Hayes, and the Court having reviewed the pleadings that were filed 
in connection with this Motion for Review and having read the cases 
that were submitted to the Court and having considered the 
arguments of counsel and based upon the bench ruling of this Court 
given on Friday, March 10, 1995, incorporated herein by this 
reference, the Court makes the following Findings of Fact, 
Conclusion of Law and Order: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. During all pertinent periods of time the Petitioners 
had a copy of the Draper City Hillside Overlay Ordinance which 
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prohibits development on slope areas in excess of thirty percent 
(30%) unless the 30% requirement is modified by the Planning 
Commission and Petitioners are deemed to have knowledge of the 
requirements of the Ordinance. 
2. The Planning Commission is the only body that may 
modify the 30% requirement based upon its finding that (1) no 
significant harm will result and (2) the proposed modification will 
result in a more functional and improved plan; and (3) the 
Developer or builder agrees to comply with any conditions or 
requirements imposed by the Planning Commission to mitigate adverse 
affects which may result from the proposed modification. 
3. The Planning Commission determined that there would 
be significant harm that would result to the uphill owners if 
Petitioners were allowed to place their home on the east portion of 
the lot in that their views would be obstructed. 
4. There was evidence before the Planning Commission 
that the building of the home on the east end of the lot would 
significantly harm the uphill property owners in that their views 
would be obstructed. 
5. This Court does not have the authority to substitute 
its judgment for that of the Planning Commission. 
6. The employees of Draper City who Petitioners 
communicated with did not have the authority to modify the slope 
requirements. 
CONCLUSION OF LAW 
1. The decision of the Planning Commission and City 
Council in refusing to modify the slope requirements of the 
p\dc-bren.ord 
Hillside Overlay District Ordinance was not arbitrary and 
capricious• 
2. Draper City is not equitably estopped from enforcing 
the provisions of its zoning ordinances against Petitioners. 
3. The Draper City Council, not the Board of 
Adjustment, properly heard the appeal of the decision of the 
Planning Commission. 
ORDER 
Therefore, based upon the Findings of this Court and its 
Conclusions of Law# it is hereby ordered that Petitioners Motion 
for Review be dismissed with prejudice and that the decision of the 
Planning Commission and City Council of Draper City in refusing to 
modify the slope requirements on Petitioners property is affirmed. 
The parties are ordered to bear their own costs incurred in this 
appeal• 
DATED this J& day of April/ 1995. 
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) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
) OF PETITIONERS' MOTION FOR 
) REVIEW OF DRAPER CITY'S 
) DECISION TO UPHOLD 
) ISSUANCE OF THE 
) STOP WORK ORDER 
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i Judge Anne M. Stirba 
Plaintiffs Stephen E. Brendle and Richard L. Maires (collectively "Petitioners") 
submit this Memorandum in Support of their Motion for Review of the Draper City 
Council's decision to uphold issuance of a Stop Work Order dated June 13, 1994. 
( 5 6 3 2 - 1 \ « e i o . s a ) 
4I 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION 1 
STATEMENT OF UNCONTROVERTED FACTS 2 
ARGUMENT 9 
I. DRAPER CITY'S DECISION TO UPHOLD THE STOP WORK ORDER 
WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS 9 
II. DRAPER CITY IS EQUITABLY ESTOPPED FROM ISSUING THE STOP 
WORK ORDER 10 
III. DRAPER CITY'S ORDINANCE AND PRACTICE REQUIRING APPEALS 
OF PLANNING COMMISSION DECISIONS TO THE CITY COUNCIL 
VIOLATE UTAH'S LAND USE ACT 12 
CONCLUSION 13 
(5632-1\«e»o.sa) -LJ-
INTRODUCTION 
This Court is asked to review Draper City's application and administration of its 
Hillside Zoning Ordinance as applied to the construction of a high-end, custom home on 
a lot in the foothills of Draper. Before purchasing the lot and commencing construction, 
Petitioners sought and obtained Draper City's zoning approval to construct the home on the 
East or upper end of the lot on a slope of approximately 30%. Draper City issued a Stop 
Work Order after some owners of neighboring lots complained that their views might be 
obstructed. The Draper City Council upheld the issuance of the Stop Work Order. 
Petitioners' Motion for Review of Draper City's decision is made pursuant to 
Sections 10-9-1001(2) and 10-9-708(1) of The Municipal Land Use Development and 
Management Act (the "Land Use Act") of the Utah Code Annotated (1992).1 
As more fully set forth below, this Court should reverse the Draper City Council's 
decision to uphold the Stop Work Order for three reasons. First, the Council's decision was 
arbitrary and capricious because, among other reasons, Draper City's own experts—both the 
Draper City Engineer and Building Official-agreed that placement of the house on the 
upper end of the lot would better serve the purposes of the Hillside Zoning Ordinance. 
1
 Section 10-9-1001(2) provides that "[a]ny person adversely affected by any decision 
made in the exercise of the provisions of this chapter may file a petition for review of the 
decision with the district court within 30 days after the local decision is rendered." Section 
10-9-708 similarly provides that rr[a]ny person adversely affected by any decision of a board 
of adjustment may petition the district court for a review of the decision." 
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Second, Draper City is equitably estopped from issuing the Stop Work Order. In reliance 
upon Draper City's zoning approval and issuance of the Building Permit, Petitioners 
purchased the lot and began construction. Third, the City Council's decision was illegal 
because under Section 10-9-703 of the Land Use Act "appeals from zoning decisions 
applying the zoning ordinance" "shall" be heard by the Board of Adjustment, not the City 
Council. 
STATEMENT OF UNCONTROVERTED FACTS 
In cases such as this where there is a record of the minutes and a transcript of the 
proceedings before the Draper Planning Commission and City Council, this Court's review 
is limited to the record below. Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-708(5). See also Xanthos v. Board 
of Adjustment of Salt Lake City, 685 P.2d 1032, 1034-35 (Utah 1984). The following 
Statement of Facts is based on the record below and Draper City's admissions in its Answer 
to Petition dated October 10, 1994 ("Answer") on file with this Court: 
1. On December 7, 1993, the Draper City Council passed and adopted the 
"Hillside Overlay District As Part of the Zoning Ordinances" of Draper (the "Hillside 
Zoning Ordinance"), a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A." 
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2. On April 5, 1994, Petitioners entered into an Option Agreement to purchase 
Lot 304 in the Cove at Bear Canyon (the "Lot") "contingent on approval from Draper City 
to locate the home on the East end of lot." Exhibit B-3 hereto.2 
3. On April 6, 1994, Draper City Engineer and Public Works Director, Gordon 
M. Haight, II, P.E. (the "City Engineer"), conducted an on-site inspection of the Lot to 
determine whether the home should be located on the East end of the Lot or at the West 
end of the Lot as originally contemplated by the developer and seller of the Lot. Petition 
for Review ("Petition") at II 5. Answer at 11 4. 
4. On April 12,1994, the City Engineer wrote a letter to Petitioners "concurring] 
with the relocation of the home in lot #304." Exhibit B-5 hereto. This letter, however, 
stated that "this concurrence does not waive any subdivision covenants, City ordinances, City 
building codes, or any other requirement that may be applicable." Id. 
5. Because of the last statement in the April 12,1994 letter, Petitioners, on April 
18, 1994, applied for a Building Permit from Draper City, submitted plot plans and building 
plans with the home site on the East end of the Lot, and sought zoning approval for placing 
the home on the East end of the Lot. Petition at 11 7; Answer at U 5. Transcript of City 
Council Meeting of August 23, 1994 (hereinafter "Council Tr.") at p.5, attached hereto as 
2
 Exhibits B-0 through B-16 were submitted to the Draper City Council. 
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Exhibit "C"; City Council Minutes (hereinafter "Council Minutes"), 11 8.4 at p.6, attached 
hereto as Exhibit "D." 
6. Lee Holmstead, the Draper City Building Official, made the following 
statement at the Draper City Planning Commission Meeting of June 23, 1994 about issuing 
the Building Permit and granting zoning approval: 
I think maybe. We issued a permit we thought everything was ok or 
we would not have issued a permit when it came in. I don't know if that is 
the plot plan they brought in or not, but it showed where the home was 
supposed to be located exactly. He wanted to move it above. I said is that 
part of the restrictive covenants - does that have to put down there. He says 
no, he didn't think so, there's no problem. Well I can't tell you you can put 
it up there. Go the City Engineer, if he'll ok it I'll ok it. And after many 
conversations with Gordon [Haight], Gordon [Haight] came back to me and 
said he feels it would be better up there [at the East end of the Lot] and I 
said I feel it would be better up there than seen here from a safety point. He 
said if you have it down below you would have to put a humongous retaining 
wall, or you have to cut the hill back to a 2/1 slope. If you cut the hill to a 
2/1 slope, the slope will be dropping down gravel and sand on the house all 
the time. So you need to put in a humongous retaining wall. So as a safety 
feature, factors I feel it is better and so does Gordon [Haight] up on the top 
[at the East end of the Lot]. 
Transcript of Planning Commission Meeting (hereinafter "P. Comm'n Tr.") at 11, attached 
hereto as Exhibit B-12. 
7. On April 22, 1994, Draper City approved the zoning and issued the Building 
Permit. A copy of the Building Permit is attached hereto as Exhibit "B-6." "All city 
departments had received the plans and given their approval. . . ." Letter of August 12, 
1994 to Mayor Elaine Redd and Draper City Council attached hereto as Exhibit "B-0." 
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8. In reliance upon Draper City's issuance of the Building Permit and granting 
zoning approval allowing construction on the East end of the Lot, Petitioners exercised the 
Option Agreement and purchased the Lot on April 24, 1994 for $61,000. Exhibit B-3 
hereto. 
9. On April 27, 1994, Petitioners commenced construction on the Lot. Exhibit 
B-2 hereto. 
10. In June 1994, Draper City received complaints from owners of neighboring 
lots that Petitioners' home might obstruct their views, and that the developer at Cove at 
Bear Canyon had verbally assured them that no home would obstruct their view. Petition 
at 11 11; Answer at H 2. Petitioners "were told a neighbor 400 feet to the North, across the 
street, their Lot sitting approximately 20 feet higher, complained we were going to block 
their view." Exhibit "B-0." 
11. Based on these Complaints, Draper City issued a Stop Work Order on June 
13, 1994. Id. 
12. Petitioners appeared before the Draper Planning Commission on June 23, 
1994. Owners of the neighboring lots objected at the meeting that their views might be 
obstructed. The Planning Commission upheld the issuance of the Stop Work Order by a 
4 to 2 vote. Petition at 11 13; Answer at 11 2. 
13. At the direction of Draper City officials, who relied upon Section 6-1-4 of the 
Land Use and Development Regulations of Draper, Utah, Petitioners appealed the Planning 
Commission's decision to the Draper City Council. Section 6-1-4A provides that "[a]ny 
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person shall have the right to appeal any decision rendered by the Planning Commission to 
the City Council" Petition at 11 14; Answer at 11 8. 
14. On August 23, 1994, the appeal of the decision of the Planning Commission 
was heard by the Draper City Council Again owners of the neighboring lots objected that 
their views might be obstructed. Petition at 11 15; Answer at 11 2. 
15. At this hearing, Petitioners presented evidence that the three factors set forth 
in Section 9-15-4(a) of the Hillside Zoning Ordinance to allow construction on a slope 
exceeding 30% were satisfied. Council Minutes, Section 8.3, at p.6. The three factors are: 
(1) No significant harm will result; and 
(2) The proposed modification will result in a more functional and 
improved plan; and 
(3) The developer/builder agrees to comply with any conditions and 
requirements imposed by the Planning Commission to mitigate 
any adverse effects which may result from the proposed 
modification. 
Section 9-15-4(a), Hillside Zoning Ordinance, Exhibit "A." 
16. Specifically, Petitioners presented evidence that the developer of the 
subdivision made road cuts in the subdivision different from the plat approved by Draper 
City. Council Minutes, 11 8.3 at p.6, Exhibit "D"; Council Tr. at 2, Exhibit MC." As a result 
of these different road cuts, placement of the home at the bottom (West end) of the Lot 
would cause scarring, removal of vegetation, and erosion that would be avoided if the home 
were placed on the top (East end) of the Lot. Council Minutes, 11 8.4 at p.6, Exhibit "D"; 
(5632-1\«e^o.sa) 6 
4£> 
Council Tr. at 3, Exhibit "C." Because of the road cuts, placement at the home at the lower 
end of the Lot would also cause the home to be placed on a slope greatly exceeding 30%. 
17. Petitioners presented evidence that the Draper City Engineer, Mr. Haight, the 
Draper City Building Official, Lee Holmstead, the Draper City Manager, David Campbell, 
and the Draper City Director of Economic Development, Paul Glauser, all agree "that the 
home should be placed on the top of Lot 304 because it is more functional, safer, and will 
have less impact. If the house is built on the bottom of the Lot, grading will be necessary 
due to sandy, gravely [sic] soil. Retaining walls will also be necessary. It appears that 
building on top will not have these problems. There will be no impact on adjacent property. 
The house fits in and blends into the hillside." Council Minutes, 11 8.3 at p.6, Exhibit "D." 
18. Petitioners presented further evidence that a home on the upper end of the 
Lot would be in substantial compliance with the 30% slope requirement. Richard L. 
Maires, a licensed engineer, stated: 
The slope - this is in front of the house - from the street down to the rront 
of the building will be 26%. The slope of the south side will be 32%, the 
slope on the north side will be 30%. These virtually fit in with your Hillside 
Ordinance. 
Council Tr. at 3, Exhibit "C." 
19. Counsel for Petitioners raised the issue of equitable estoppel and stated that 
views of the neighbors were not a proper consideration under the Hillside Zoning 
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Ordinance. Council Tr. at 4-5, Exhibit "C"; Council Minutes, 11 8.4 at p.6, Exhibit "D." 
Moreover, counsel pointed out that Draper would be violating the spirit of the Hillside 
Zoning Ordinance because construction had already started on the upper end of the Lot, 
and the Lot could not be returned to its original condition. Id. 
20. The City Council upheld the decision of the Planning Commission by a vote 
of 3 to 0. Petition at 11 15; Answer at U 2. The stated reason for the vote "is that this would 
be setting a precedence [sic] and if we go against the Hillside Ordinance we will have a lot 
of problems." Council Minutes, 11 8.7 at p.7, Exhibit "D." 
21. On August 24, 1994, counsel for Petitioners wrote a letter to Draper City 
stating that the appeal of the decision of the Planning Commission should have been heard 
by the Board of Adjustment, not the City Council. The August 24, 1994 letter further 
requested the Petitioners' appeal be properly lodged and heard by the Draper City Board 
of Adjustment. Petition at II 16; Answer at 11 2. A copy of this August 24, 1994 letter is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "E." 
22. In an August 29, 1994 letter, counsel for Draper denied Petitioners' request 
to have the appeal heard by the Board of Adjustment. A copy of this August 29, 1994 is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "F." 
23. Draper has admitted that Petitioners have exhausted their administrative 
remedies. Petition at 11 22; Answer at 11 2. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. DRAPER CITY'S DECISION TO UPHOLD THE STOP WORK ORDER WAS 
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS, 
In reviewing Draper City's decision, this Court applies the "arbitrary and capricious" 
standard. Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756 P.2d 704, 709 (Utah App. 1988), cert, denied, 
765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). If the decision is not supported by substantial evidence, or is 
based on improper criteria, the court will invalidate the decision by the zoning authority. 
E.g.. Navlor v. Salt Lake City Corp., 398 P.2d 27,28-29 (1965). A decision is arbitrary when 
the reasons for the decision "are without factual basis" or consist of "vague reservations." 
Davis County. 765 P.2d at 711. 
In this case, Draper City's decision was arbitrary and capricious for several reasons. 
First, Draper City's own experts -- its City Engineer, Building Official, and others - all 
agreed that placement of the home on the upper end of the Lot better served the purposes 
of the Hillside Zoning Ordinance. No contrary evidence was offered. Thus, the Draper 
City Council's decision was not supported by "substantial evidence" and was "without factual 
basis." 
Second, the City Council's decision was not made on the merits, but was based on 
an improper factor not provided for in the Hillside Zoning Ordinance-the neighbors' 
concerns about possibly obstructed views. Utah law is clear that a City may not base its 
decision on an improper factor not provided for in the zoning ordinance. As the Utah 
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Supreme Court stated, "the consent of neighboring landowners may not be made a criterion. 
. . ." Thurston v. Cache County, 676 P.2d 440, 445 (Utah 1981). Because nobody presented 
any substantial evidence that placement of the home on the upper end of the Lot would 
harm the hillside and the only objection was neighbors' concerns about potentially 
obstructed views, it is clear that the City Council based its decision on this improper factor. 
Third, the stated reason that "this would be setting a precedence [sic] and if we go 
against the Hillside Ordinance we will have a lot of problems," (Council Minutes, 11 8.7 at 
p.7) is not a legally sufficient finding by the City Council. None of the alleged "problems" 
were articulated by the City Council. Utah law is clear that "vague reservations" 
unsupported by fact will not support administrative action. Davis County, 756 P.2d at 711. 
In short, the reasons for Draper's decision fly in the face of Draper's own expert's 
opinion on the application of the Hillside Zoning Ordinance. Moreover, the "vague 
reservations expressed by either the single family owners or the [council] members" 
demonstrate that the decision was "arbitrary and capricious." Id. at 711. 
II. DRAPER CITY IS EQUITABLY ESTOPPED FROM ISSUING THE STOP WORK 
ORDER. 
This is not the type of case where a zoning violator "acted in bad faith, fraudulently 
or with knowledge." Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake City, 685 P.2d 1032, 1038 
(Utah 1984). Rather, Petitioners complied with every requirement that Draper City officials 
told them was necessary before purchasing the Lot and commencing construction. 
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Petitioners came to the City, took the City Engineer to the site, and after receiving a letter 
stating that the letter does not waive compliance with zoning ordinances, sought and 
obtained zoning approval and a Building Permit from the City. In reliance on receiving 
zoning approval, issuance of the Building Permit, and Draper City's assurances that they had 
complied with all requirements, Petitioners purchased the Lot and commenced construction, 
incurring substantial expenses. 
The Utah Supreme Court has made clear that in situations such as this, the City is 
equitably estopped from issuing a Stop Work Order: 
To invoke the doctrine the [city] must have committed an act or omission 
upon which the developer could rely in good faith in making substantial 
changes in position or incurring extensive expenses. The action upon which 
the developer claims reliance must be of a clear, definite and affirmative 
nature. If the claim be based on an omission of the local zoning authority, 
omission means a negligent or culpable omission where the party failing to act 
was under a duty to do so. Silence or inaction will not operate to work an 
estoppel. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the landowner has a duty to 
inquire and confer with the local zoning authority regarding the uses of the 
property that would be permitted. 
Utah County v. Young. 615 P.2d 1265, 1267-68 (Utah 1980) (citations omitted). 
In this case, Petitioners "inquire[d] and conferred] with local zoning authorities" and 
made "substantial changes in position" and "incur[red] extensive expenses" in "good faith" 
reliance on Draper's approval and issuance of the Building Permit. Id. Draper's actions 
were "clear, definite and affirmative." Town of Alta v. Ben Home Corp., 836 P.2d 797, 803 
(Utah App. 1992). Draper is equitably estopped from issuing the Stop Work Order. 
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III. DRAPER CITY'S ORDINANCE AND PRACTICE REQUIRING APPEALS OF 
PLANNING COMMISSION DECISIONS TO THE CITY COUNCIL VIOLATE 
UTAH'S LAND USE ACT. 
As set forth above, Petitioners appealed the Planning Commission's decision to the 
Draper City Council at the direction of Draper Officials who relied upon Section 6-1-4 of 
the Land Use and Development Regulations of Draper, Utah. Section 6-1-4A provides that 
f,[a]ny person shall have the right to appeal by decision rendered by the Planning 
Commission to the City Council." Moreover, Petitioners attempted to appeal this matter 
to the Board of Adjustment, but were denied the opportunity to do so. 
Section 6-1-4A of the Land Use and Development Regulations of Draper, Utah and 
Draper's practice of having appeals of Planning Commission decisions heard by the City 
Council violate Utah's Land Use Act. Section 10-9-703(1) of the Land Use Act expressly 
provides: 
The board of adjustment shall hear and decide: 
(a) appeals from zoning decisions applying the zoning 
ordinance. 
§ 10-9-703, Utah Code Ann. (1992) (emphasis added). This case clearly involves a zoning 
decision applying the zoning ordinance. 
In construing the predecessor to Section 10-9-703, the Utah Supreme Court made 
clear that the Board of Adjustment is to be the "appellate body for any person aggrieved 
by a zoning decision." Chambers v. Smithfield City, 714 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Utah 1986). 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should find that Draper acted arbitrarily 
and capriciously and is equitably estopped in issuing the Stop Work Order. This Court 
should also find that Draper's practice and ordinance of having zoning appeals heard by the 
City Council violates the Act This Court should reverse Draper City's decision to uphold 
the Stop Work Order, allowing Petitioners to resume construction of their home on the East 
end of the Lot 
DATED this D^ day of November, 1994. 
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE 
By: ArT.ea^ 
Gregory D, 
Attorneys 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS' MOTION FOR REVIEW OF DRAPER CITY'S 
DECISION TO UPHOLD ISSUANCE OF STOP WORK ORDER, postage prepaid, this 
-> day of November, 1994, to the following: 
Michael Z. Hayes 
Michael J. Mazuran 
MAZURAN & HAYES. P.C 
1245 East Brickyard Road, Suite 250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
iSrfstt^ 
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